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Abstract 
Most research on southern Africa focuses on the total 
dependency of the region's states--Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe--upon the 
dominant power I South Africa. This thesis examines the 
relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe and argues that 
these two states are more interdependent than dependency 
scholars would acknowledge. 
Although a study of the historical period reveals that 
dependency theory, as defined by Raul Prebisch, Andre Gunder 
Frank and A. Val enzuel a, is hel pful for understanding the 
development of relations between the two states, it is unable 
to account for many of the characteristics of the relationship 
which are found in the contemporary context, especially since 
1980. An examination of various economic areas of interac-
tion, including investment, trade and transportation, as well 
as the political realm, indicates that each state exhibits a 
degree of dependence upon the other. Thus, it is possible to 
characterize the relationship as one of "mutual dependence," 
or interdependence as defined by Robert Keohane and Joseph S. 
Nye. Interdependence is further examined through the concepts 
of sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity signifies the 
ability of a state to respond effectively to policy changes 
made by another state wi thin a given area of interaction 
without incurring large costs, while vulnerability denotes 
that an actor is unable to respond, or only at great cost. By 
applying these concepts to the relationship between Zimbabwe 
and South Africa, it is determined that although South Africa 
tends to be sensitive while Zimbabwe is generally vulnerable, 
the degrees to which these two states are sensi ti ve and 
vulnerable varies over time and issue area. 
As the changes wi thin South Africa start to affect 
relations with the rest of _southern Africa, it will be 
necessary to understand the interaction between the states 
from an interdependency perspective if cooperation within the 
region wi 11 be successful. By appl ying an interdependence 
framework, this study aims at contributing to the understand-
ing of relations among the countries of southern Africa in 
general, and between South Africa and Zimbabwe in particular. 
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CHAPTER. 1 
:Introduction 
On 30 September 1986, the South African government published 
details of a new trade agreement it had recently concluded with the 
government of Zimbabwe. Meanwhile, only a few days prior to the deal 
being made public, the President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe had 
emphatically underscored his government's commitment to the imposition 
and support of sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa.1 
Subsequent to South Africa's embarrassing revelation, Mr. Mugabe denied 
knowledge of the negotiations claiming that it was a "routine matter for 
officials. ,,2 This event represents the conflict within policy-making and 
between policy makers in the political economy of the region of southern 
Africa in general, and relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe in 
particular. 
The geographic region of southern Africa is comprised of Angola, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. Tanzania and Zaire may also be included as part of 
lAfrica Research Bulletin, (Economic Series), (~ September 1986), p. 8352A. 
'Ibid, p. 8352B. 
1 
2 
a larger economic and political functional region. Within the region, a 
struggle for racial domination, political power and economic hegemony is 
taking place in which each state plays an important part. The leading 
actor is the white dominated state of South Africa which has sought to 
maintain its domination since colonial times through a variety of economic, 
military and political policies. During the late 1970s and throughout the 
1980s South African attempts at maintaining its hegemony over the region 
was manifested in the 'total strategy' of destabilizing neighbouring 
countries using economic and military levers. The other states in southern 
Africa have attempted to combat this dominance through a variety of means 
as well. Attempts have been made by them to disengage themselves from 
the economic dominance of South Africa and to isolate politically the racist 
regime. 
At the forefront of this struggle is South Africa's northern 
neighbour, Zimbabwe. The politico-economic relations between these two 
countries hold an important clue to understanding the dynamics of the 
regional struggle and demonstrate that policy making responds to a variety 
of stimuli, including changes in the international and regional setting as 
well as changes within each national context. The purpose of this paper 
is to gain a better understanding of the region of southern Africa by 
closer investigation of the relationship between two of the principal actors-
-South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
South Africa is a large country which dwarfs its neighbours in 
economic terms. It has a relatively developed economy, substantial human 
and natural resources, and political continuity. 
3 
The neighbouring 
countries, by comparison, have fewer natural resources, smaller popula-
tions, underdeveloped economies which depend upon one or two primary 
commodities for up to half of their GNP, and have oversized bureaucracy 
and service sectors} Zimbabwe stands out in the region as it has a fairly 
diversified economy with a large manufacturing sector, a substantial 
quantity of natural resources and a large skilled workforce. In addition, 
President Mugabe is a well respected and charismatic Third World leader 
who has led the fight against the domination of South Africa since 
Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. The country's geographic, economic and 
political position within southern Africa make the relations between it and 
South Africa vitally important to the future of the region, regardless of 
the victor in the anti-apartheid struggle within South Africa. 
Although other relations within the region are no less significant to 
understanding southern Africa as a whole, that between Zimbabwe and 
South Africa is of particular interest for several reasons. Firstly, the two 
countries share a very similar colonial history which has led various 
regional and international observers, as well as the South African and 
Zimbabwean governments, to make comparisons between the present 
situation in South Africa and the independence struggle within Zimbabwe. 
This, in turn, has led to predictions of a future for South Africa similar 
to that of post-independence Zimbabwe. Secondly, each state sees the 
other, for very different reasons, as a key to stability in the region. 
Thirdly, Zimbabwe and South Africa are the two most economically 
SMri.ca South of the sahara 1990 (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1989), various pages. 
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developed states in southern Africa, which places them at the center of 
development strategies promoted by regional and international agents. 
Finally, Zimbabwe at this stage holds a key leadership position in the fight 
against the South African apartheid regime, while South Africa's percep-
tions of Zimbabwe have been crucial to the determination of South African 
regional policy. 
The relationship between these two states has been explored by 
scholars generally through the framework of dependency theory. From 
this perspective, South Africa, the dominant actor, is said to dictate the 
econotru,.c and political orientation of Zimbabwean policies by exploiting its 
economic leverage over the latter, as well as by resorting to military 
tactics. In this analysis, however, it will be argued that although South 
Africa is the dominant actor, Zimbabwe exercises considerable independence 
of action and manipulates ties with South Africa to its advantage whenever 
possible. Thus, this study argues that while dependency theory provides 
an explanation for the historical development of Zimbabwe vis-a.-vis South 
Africa, it is insufficient in providing a complete understanding of this 
particular relationship as well as regional relations. Specifically I it cannot 
explain the leverage Zimbabwe exercises over South Africa in certain areas 
of interaction. Therefore, dependency analysis must be complemented with 
an interdependence paradigm to provide a more thorough and balanced 
view of the relationship. 
An examination of the literature on southern Africa reveals a 
substantive lack of work on this particular relationship from the perspec-
5 
tive of interdependence. Most of the available literature is situated within 
the dependency framework, and focuses on the domination of South Africa.4 
These analyses see the activities of neighbouring states as responding to 
overwhelming South African pressure because their dependent position 
allows them no room for alternate and independent decision making. 
However, this work seeks to demonstrate that weak states such as 
Zimbabwe, are, nevertheless, able to exert influence over the dominant 
states such as South Africa. 
In considering the relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe, 
it is discovered that South Africa is indeed affected by policies made by 
the Zimbabwean government, and that it reacts to those policies often with 
little success in achieving its objectives. Thus, it is found that South 
Africa is sensitive to policy-making in its neighbouring states and is 
therefore interdependent with its neighbours.5 Nevertheless, this 
interdependency tends to be asymmetrical; weaker states such as Zimbabwe 
are more vulnerable to South African policy-making than the reverse. This 
paper will elucidate those points of interdependence between Zimbabwe and 
South Africa which reflect the areas of sensitivity and vulnerability of 
both states in the relationship between them. 
4See for example, Thomas II. caJIaghy, ed., South Africa in Southern Africa: The Intensifying vortex of Violence (New York: Praeqer, 1983); 
Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, Apartheid Terrorism: The DestaInlization Report (London: The Commonweaith Secretariat, 1989). 
5The interdependence paradigm, including the concepts of sensitivity and vulnerability, are derived from Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 
Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 'l'ransition (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1977). Briefly, interdependence in this 
paper will refer to all levels of mutual dependence, including that which is highly asymmetrical. Sensitivity refers to the ability of an actor to 
respond to a policy change made by a state with which it has interaction in a particular regime, or area of interaction, and the amount of time which 
is required to implement that response. If the actor is able to respond very quickly then it is said to be sensitive. If the actor is unable to 
respond, or is able to respond only with a great deai of effort over an extended period of time, it is said to be vulnerable. These concepts are 
further e1ahorated in Chapter 2. 
6 
Three limitations of this study must be noted before proceeding. 
First, due to a lack of access to primary sources, no new materials are 
being presented.' Second, other regional and international actors, 
although often very important, are only considered when they are 
necessary to provide further insight into the relationship being studied. 
Finally, with the election of President F. W. DeKlerk in South Africa it 
appears that a new era of south African domestic and foreign policy-
making has begun. DeKlerk has initiated new policy directions which seem 
to signal a willingness to work towards ending apartheid and also to 
reduce tensions in relations with neighbouring states, including Zimbabwe. 
While the nature of the relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe is 
changing as a result of this new orientation,. this thesis covers relations 
until 1989 only. It is recognized that the rapid transformations taking 
place within the region, and the new evidence emerging on the direction 
that they may take, challenge some of the arguments presented in this 
analysis. However examination of these changes and their implications for 
future relations are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The format of this thesis is as follows. The first chapter outlines 
the two theoretical frameworks which are being employed: those of 
dependency and interdependency. Briefly I dependency is understood to 
mean a condition in which the foreign and domestic politics and economics 
'Very little primary source material is available. The South African government does not publish detailed trade statistics withits African trading 
partners and statistics for Rhodesia's trade with South Africa between 1965 and 1980 are incomplete making analysis difficult. In an attempt to 
acquire information from the Zimbabwean embassy on Zimbabwe's relations with South Africa, I was told that the government there has no stated 
foreign policy poStion as it does not exchange embassies with the South African government. other requests for information from the Zimbabwea.'1 
embassy would have required more time than was available for completing this thesis. Where possible, government statistical sources and Hansard 
have been consulted. Where se::ondary sources present conflicting details of specific events, newspaper accounts in the Times (London) and the New 
York Times. which are assumed to be accurate, have been consulted to determine the exact details. 
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of one state (the weaker or peripheral state) are conditioned by the 
strategies of the dominant (or centre) state.? The definition of 
interdependency employed is that of R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye who define 
it as "mutual dependence.'" In other words, policies and activities of one 
actor affect those of another I and vice versa. Moreover I this interdepen-
dence between actors can be unequal or asymmetrical. The chapter also 
examines the main body of literature dealing with southern Africa. These 
works are generally divided into the two schools of thought discussed 
above, with no attempt being made by the authors to integrate these 
frameworks. 
The second chapter presents a historical survey of relations between 
the two countries from the establishment of Rhodesia in 1890 up to its 
independence as Zimbabwe in 1980.' This period is divided into several 
phases each representing the major changes in policy as determined by the 
changing regional and international setting. Thus, it examines the early 
colonial history of Rhodesia, the era between the establishment of 
Rhodesian self-government in 1923 until its Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (UDI) in 1965, the first period of UDI up to the Portuguese 
coup in 1974, the shift of Rhodesian dependence from Great Britain to 
South Africa during UDI, and the final six years until its independence and 
the formation of Zimbabwe in 1980. Throughout the discussion it is evident 
7 RaUl Prebisch, "The Dynamics of Peripheral Capitalism," in Louis Lefeber and Liisal North, eds., Democracy and Developmenti11 Latin Amer..ca 
No. 1 (Toronto: studies on the Polit:icaJ. Economy, Society and culture of Latin America and the caribbean, 1980) p. 25. In Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories 
of Development and Underdevelopment (Boulder, co: Westview Press, Inc., 1984), p. 25. 
'Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Palitics in Transition (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1977), p. 8. 
'Zimbabwe refers to the state that was formed in 1980. Prior to that date, Rhodesia will be used to refer to the poJiJical unit wr.i.ch was known 
as Southern Rhodesia from 1890-1963, Rhodesia from 1964-1978, and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia from 1978-1980. 
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that the dependency perspective provides the most accurate understanding 
of the historical development of this relationship. 
The third chapter builds on the themes developed in the previous 
section in attempting to understand relations between the two governments 
in the post-1980 period. A brief examination of the regional setting into 
which Zimbabwe emerged is followed by a detailed study of the economic 
(investment, trade and transportation) and political ties between Zimbabwe 
and South Africa. The analysis begins with the in vestment relationship 
between the two states in which Zimbabwe exhibits a high degree of 
dependency on South Africa. Relations in the areas of trade and 
transportation, however, are found to be more characteristic of 
interdependency than dependency. Finally, examination of political 
relations confirms that each state is sensitive to policies made in the other 
which implies mutual dependence or interdependence. Thus, overall the 
relationship between Zimbabwe and South Africa is found to exhibit the 
qualities necessary for both dependency and interdependency analysis. 
The conclusion reexamines the themes discussed in the preceding 
chapters and speculates on the future of relations between the two states. 
The region is currently undergoing a period of revolutionary change with 
domestic transformation within South Africa being reflected in new regional 
and international policies. However, there is a great deal of continuity in 
South African policy-making, and the pattern of past relations between it 
and its northern neighbour holds a key to understanding future relations, 
whatever the outcome of the struggle within south Africa. 
CHAPTER 2 
Dependency versus Interdependency 
in Southern Africa 
A review of the literature 
Since 1968 two main perspectives have been presented in the 
literature on southern Africa: dependency and interdependency. Although 
both views have been treated as mutually exclusive explanations of the 
existing political and economic regional interactions by authors and 
observers, neither theory, upon closer examination, offers an adequate 
explanation of these relationships. This section will examine dependency 
and interdependency, as well as representative works which utilize these 
frameworks for their analysis of southern Africa in general, and the 
relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe in particular, to demon-
strate the strengths and weaknesses of these theories. Furthermore, this 
chapter will establish the necessity of a study which integrates depend-
ency and interdependency as examined in the following chapters. This 
chapter is divided into four sections: the first examines dependency; the 
second looks at dependency in the literature on southern Africa; the third 
discusses interdependency; and the final section deals with the literature 
on interdependency in southern Africa. 
9 
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The basic argument of the dependency school emerged from the work 
of Latin American scholars in the mid to late 1960s.1 It was heralded as 
a major breakthrough in the study of underdevelopment, which to that 
point had been dominated by the eurocentric modernization theory.2 The 
modernization paradigm was first developed to explain the economic 
development and growth of the western capitalist economies. It was based 
on the concept that underdevelopment was basically the result of a 
shortage of capital which was necessary to set off the process of capital 
accumulation and development.s Walt Rostow claimed that development was 
a logical progression through five stages--the traditional society; the pre 
take-off stage; take-off; the road to maturity; and the society of mass 
consumption--and in order to begin the process, a traditional society had 
to be pushed into the pre take-off stage where the prerequisites for 
growth were established.· In addition, the modernization theorists made 
distinctions between 'modern' and 'traditional' societies with the implication 
that the former was better than the latter.s 
When modernization theory was applied to the underdeveloped 
countries, it became evident that the facts of underdevelopment differed 
lSee for eDIII~ Andre Gunder Frank, capitalism and UnderdevelopElt in Latin America: Historical studies of Chile and Bruil (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1967); Fernando Henrique Cardoso and EnI.O Palett:o, Dependency and Development translated by Marjory Mattingley UrquiCi 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979). 
2 Magnus Blomstrom and BjOrn Hettne, Development Theory in 'l'ransi.tion. The Dependency Debate and Beyond: Third World Responses (London: 
Zed Books Ltd., 1984) p. 27. 
'Ibid., p. 13. 
·Walt Rostow, The stages of Economic Growth: A Non-communist Manifesto (cambridge: University Press, 1962). 
5 Examples of the major works within the modernization paradigm include, Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the 
Developing Areas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964) and Restow, stages of Growth. 
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considerably from the theoretical assumptions. The underdeveloped 
countries appeared to be unable to reach the "pre take-off stage" not 
because they were too 'traditional' but because the western economic model 
was not applicable to their societies and they were involved in an 
international economic order the structures of which hindered their 
development. Thus, a new school, referred to as dependency, emerged to 
explain the position of the underdeveloped countries in the international 
economic system, and how they got to that position. Initially their analysis 
focused specifically on Latin America. 
Scholars such as F. Cardoso and A. Frank attempted to explain the 
underdevelopment of Latin America in terms of, the hlstoricallegacy left by 
colonialism and neo-colonialism.' Colonialism was defined as the period 
during which the European expansion forcibly integrated the areas which 
now make up the states of the Third World into the European economies. 
These regions became producers of raw materials and commodities which 
were the primary inputs for the industrial structure of western Europe. 
With the demise of the colonial empires following the Second World War, 
direct colonialism was replaced by neo-colonialism which perpetuated the 
domination of the' Third World through indirect means such as multinational 
corporations, bilateral and multilateral aid and the establishment of military 
bases.1 Dependency theorists argue that despite the formal independence 
of the underdeveloped states, they continued to be dominated by Europe 
because the developing countries were relegated to economic relationships 
'cardoso and Faletto, Dependency and Development; Fra.,k, Capi!:aJism and underdevelopment. 
I Ibid. 
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in which they acted as suppliers of raw materials for manufactured goods 
produced in the developed states. Thus, the developed economies expanded 
at the expense of Third World economies. In sum, the fundamental position 
of the dependency perspective as outlined by Latin American authors, is 
that the international order is such that "a certain number of countries 
have their economies conditioned by the development and expansion of 
another ... placing the dependent countries in a back ward position exploited 
by the dominant countries.'" 
DEPEB»EBCY AB» SOUTHERB AFRICA 
The dependency theory was quickly appropriated by scholars 
examining other Third World areas, and a tremendous body of literature 
emerged which demonstrated that the industrial capitalist countries were 
responsible, in large part, for the lack of development and economic growth 
in all peripheral areas, not just Latin America.' Scholars of southern 
Africa applied this view to their studies, and concluded that south Africa 
was the regional representative of western capitalism and the dominant 
centre which exploited its dependent, economically weak neighbours.10 
8 J. Samuel Valenzuela t'1d Arturo Valenzuela, "Modernization and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the study of Latin Ame.rican 
Underdevelopment," Comparative Politics (July 1978), p. 544. RaUl Prebisch also offers a comprehensive definition of dependency: "By dependence 
I mean relations between centres and the periphery whereby a country is subjected to decisions taken in the centres, not only in economic matters, 
but also in matters of politics and strategy for domestic and foreign policies. The consequence in that due to exterior pressure the country cannot 
decide autonomously what it should do or cease daing." Prebisch, liThe Dynamics of Peripheral Capitalism," in Louis Lefeber and Liisal North, eds., 
Democracy and Development in Latin America, No. 1 (Toronto: studies on the Political Economy, Scciety and culture of Latin America and the 
caribbean, 1980) p. 25. Quoted L'1 Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories of Development and Underdevelollment (Boulder, CO: westview Press, 1984), p. 25. 
'See for example, Giovamri Arrighi and John S. Saul, Essays on the Political Economy of Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973). 
10 samir Amin, Derrick Chitala and rbbo Mandm, eds., SADCC Prospects for Disengagement and Development in Southern Africa (London: Zed 
Books, Ltd., 1987). 
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It is traditionally assumed that Zimbabwe, although not as economical-
ly depressed as other southern African states, is dependent upon South 
Africa for its continued economic well-being.ll Analysts of the depend-
ency perspective explain Zimbabwe's political instability and economic 
underdevelopment in terms of the colonial inheritance. In other words, it 
is suggested that the imperial powers which had colonized the region, 
Great Britain and Portugal, manipulated the southern African regional 
economy and created a situation in which the South African state could 
economically dominate its neighbours, including Zimbabwe.12 These artifi.-
cially developed economic ties still exist and South Africa continues to 
exploit its dominant position vis-a.-vis its northern neighbour through 
military and economic destabilization. Although, as shown below, acknowl-
edgement is made by dependency theorists that there is a degree of 
interdependence between the two countries, this is thought to be highly 
one-sided and tending to work against Zimbabwean interests. In contrast, 
this thesis demonstrates that the relationship between South Africa and 
Zimbabwe is best understood from a perspective of interdependence which 
emphasizes a mutual dependence, albeit an asymmetrical one. At the same 
time, the historical insights offered by dependency theory are also 
acknowledged. 
111arry W. Bowman, Michael Bratton and Rukudo Hurapa, HZimbabweand South Africa: Dependency, llestabilizaI:i and Liberation.H In South 
Africa in Southern Africa: The Intensifying Vortex of Violence. ed. Thomas M. caJ1aghy (New York: praeqer Publishers, 1983), pp. 323-354; Jeffrey 
Herbst, state Politics in Zi.J:t.bahwe, (Berkeley: University of california Press, 1990); Colin stoneman, ed, Zi.'llbabwe's Inheritance (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1981). 
12 The two main imperial powers in southern Africa, Great Britain and Portugal, left a lasting impression on their respective colonies which have 
characterized relations within the region even since decoloni:ation took place. The activities of both states influenced Zimbabwe's own struggle for 
independence and t.1Je outcome of that struggle. This will be e1ahorated on in Chapter 2. 
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The application of the dependency perspective to the study of 
southern Africa was first done by Larry Bowman.ll It was his goal to 
identify the interrelations between the southern African states in order to 
demonstrate the importance of such relations for understanding and 
evaluating regional politics. In his paper, "The Subordinate state System 
of Southern Africa", Bowman presents the hypothesis that southern Africa 
represents a region of states which functions outside of the primary global 
power blocs, and must be analysed and understood in terms of the 
relations between regional states.a Furthermore, Bowman emphasizes the 
role of South Africa and claims that its economic domination of the region 
is the ~'overwhelming structural characteristic" which unifies the region,u 
With respect to Zimbabwe, Bowman admits that prior to the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence Zimbabwe had close, but not fully dependent, 
economic ties with south AfricaY However, he asserts the events of 1965 
completely changed this relationship and made Zimbabwe "absolutely 
beholden" to South Africa for its very survivalY 
Prior to Bowman's analysis, very little work had been done on 
southern Africa as a unit.lI However, this soon changed as scholars 
13Larry Bowman, liThe Subordinate state System of Southern Aft.£a," International Quarterly 12, 3 (September 1968), pp. 231-61. 
14 Ibid., p.m. 
lSIbid., p. 238. 
liOn November 11, 1965 the government of Rhodesia lead by Prime lolinit..er Ian Smith ill'.ilateralIy declared L'ldependence from Great Britaill. 
This declaration was VJfwed as illegal by the British government and immediately condemned by the international community II hich then imposed 
economic 5alJctions upon l1e smith governmenl For further elaboration of this event and its implications for relations between Rhodesia and SOut1 
Africa, see Chapter 3, pages 43 to 47 below. 
11 Bowman, If SuoordL'late state System", p. 242. 
18 Ally analysis which had been done, examined the region in the context of the roles of the impe..rial powers within it. See for example Colin 
Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia (London: Oxford Gniversity Press, 1959). The lack of unified regional analysis prior to his writing 
is one of Bowman's chief complaints. He observes that "[tlhe study of Southern African politics has always been fragmented because of the differing 
histories of the various countries and the wide vadety of constitutional and legal forms under which they have been gove..'1led." He then se'"..s out 
to establish a framework in which analysis of regi..onal interrelations could be carried out. Bowman, "Subordinate state System," pp. 231-234. 
15 
adopted Bowman's concept of sub-system analysis in the face of revolution-
ary political developments within the region, such as the decolonization of 
Angola and Mozambique. As a consequence of increasing political instability 
within the region, resulting from the inability of the new governments in 
Angola and Mozambique to consolidate their power and the continued 
guerilla struggle within Zimbabwe, South Africa's dominant role attracted 
greater international scholarly attention. The focus of the new studies was 
South African policy responses to the changing regional situation, and the 
reaction these policies engendered within the neighbouring states. In sum, 
the concentration of scholars was with the overwhelming dependency of the 
region on South Africa. 
In the late-1970s and early 1980s it became apparent that previously 
established economic ties within southern Africa allowed South Africa to 
employ a policy of destabilization against its neighbours.!' Destabilization, 
critics suggest, is both a reinforcement to and a result of dependency. 
One of the most outspoken critics of destabilization, working within the 
dependency framework, is Joseph Hanlon. In two of his recent books, 
Apartheid's Second Front and Beggar Your Neighbours, Hanlon recounts, 
in considerable detail, the policy of destabilization employed by South 
Africa against its neighbours, and details how dependent economic linkages 
facilitate that destabilization. 2o 
1 'lle.stabilizati refers to military and economic measures employed by South Africa, against neighbouring states, which cause political and 
econ01lD.c insecULiy within the affected states. A very good analysis of the consequences of destabilization for southern African states was done 
hy Robert Davis and Dan O'Jleara in their"Total strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy Since 1978," Journal of 
Southern African studies, 11, 2 (Apd1985), pp. 183-211. 
20 Joseph Hanlon, Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa's war against its neighbours (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1986) and Beggar Your 
Neighbours: Apartheid Paller in Sol.1hern Afdca (London: catholic Institute for International Relations, 1986). 
i 
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In Apartheid's Second Front Hanlon examines the process of 
destabilization on a regional level. The causes of destabilization are rooted 
in the threat to apartheid felt by the South African government on the 
home front.n Denying that internal unrest is a result of apartheid 
policies, the government looks toward external factors and blames African 
nationalism and communist infiltration in neighbouring states for the 
problems at home. Through destabilization the government believes it is 
able to mitigate these external threats.22 Specific reference to Zimbabwe 
is limited in Hanlon's work. However, he does argue that South African 
participation in the Zimbabwean independence struggle and the 
destabilization campaign launched against Zimbabwe in 1981 were largely 
responsible for the economic chaos and. political instability within 
ZimbabweY Hanlon considers South Africa to have played a major role in 
assisting the Smith regime to maintain control during the UDI period. In 
addition, South African influence during the pre-independence negotiations 
is believed to be responsible for Smith's appearance at the bargaining 
table. 
The story which Hanlon tells is interesting as a narrative of 
dramatic events, however, his analysis is weak. He fails to come to terms 
with the faet that South African destabilization activity is often contra-
dietory and harmful to its own interests, as will be discussed in chapter 
four. Moreover, he does not indicate or analyse the factors which set off 
the campaign against Zimbabwe by South Africa. 
2lHaruon, Apartheid's Second Front, pp. 13-19. 
22T1.:d '2 llJ.i. I, p, 1. 
!lIbid., p. 96. 
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Beggar Your Neighbours is a much stronger appraisal of the 
dynamics of relations between South Africa and its neighbours. In it 
Hanlon elaborates on the evidence of South African military activities and 
economic sabotage which he presented in Apartheid's Second Front. In 
doing so, he attempts to show how the dependence of regional states upon 
South Africa facilitates the South African government's primary goal of 
defending its apartheid system. Hanlon outlines four goals of his study, 
but the most important one for this analysis is his intention to prove that 
South Africa deliberately undermines the stability of its neighbours and 
vigorously reinforces their dependence.24 The evidence which Hanlon 
presents clearly demonstrates the aggressive behaviour of the South 
African government against its neighbours. Nevertheless, his analysis is 
inadequate for a complete understanding of regional relations with South 
Africa because he neither examines the consequences that economic ties 
with the region have for South Africa, nor does he account for the import-
ance which political ties, or lack of them, hold for South African policy-
makers. Moreover, by seeking to demonstrate that the southern African 
states are helplessly dependent upon South Africa, Hanlon inadvertently 
supports the South African view which he is attempting to discredit. 2S 
That is, he lends credence to the South African claim that because of the 
southern African states' dependence on it, international sanctions against 
South Africa will be harmful to these states also. 
2 (Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, p. 4. 
2 ~ South African propaganda often points to the dependence at the region upon it when attempting to deter international sanctions and diffuse 
anti-South Africa sentiment in the llest. South Africa Mainstay at Southern Africa published by the South African Department at Foreign Affairs 
in 1985 is a prime example of this attitude. 
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Phyllis Johnson and David Martin's edited volume Frontline Southern 
Africa, also takes the view that South Africa is the primary beneficiary of 
relations in the region, and that it follows a policy of 'destructive 
engagement' to promote its advantage. 2i In accordance with Hanlon, the 
authors claim that apartheid is the underlying cause of South Africa's 
practice of destabilization, and that the policy is so destructive to its 
neighbours that the region has been embroiled in a perpetual state of 
warY The purpose behind this strategy, according to the authors, "is 
to create and maintain a dependence that will be economically lucrative and 
politically submissive--and will serve as a bulwark against the imposition 
of sanctions.,,21 Thus, South Africa's primary concern is the maintenance 
of apartheid, and the direction of destabilization activity outwards to 
protect the status quo. 
In their chapter on Zimbabwe, Johnson and Martin do acknowledge 
some degree of interdependence between South Africa and Zimbabwe. They 
note that the South African government faces a dilemma in its policy-
making towards Zimbabwe which is the result of South Africa's vulnerabil-
ity to the security I trade, and business policies of other southern African 
states, particularly Zimbabwe.a However, like Hanlon, this aspect is 
underemphasized by the authors as attention is directed primarily toward 
activities undertaken by the South African government which are designed 
to foster South African aims and interests. 
2i'Destructive engagement' is the term utilized by Johnson and Mar..n when referring to destabilizati.on. See Phyllis Jor,nson and David Martin, 
eds., Frontline Southern Africa: Destructive Enaagement (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1988). 
21 Johnson and Martin, "Introduction" in Frontline S()ul~ern Africa, p. m 
21 Tb'd ' 
.1., p, m 
19 Jor~'lson and Marti'l, "Zilnbabwe: Aparl~ei.d's Dilemma,· in Frontline Southern Africa, p. 57. 
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The strength of Johnson and Martin's chapter is the substantial 
evidence they document with respect to South Africa's destabilization 
activities within Zimbabwe. Occasionally, however, the authors focus almost 
exclusively on description of the destabilization tactics and overlook the 
implications South African actions have for its relations with the region. 
That is, they do not examine how these policies affect South Africa itself. 
In addition, like other literature within the dependency perspective, the 
authors' extreme bias results in a severely one-sided presentation in which 
the source of all of Zimbabwe's problems is South African aggression. 
Despite its dominance in the literature on underdevelopment the 
dependency framework proved limited in its explanatory capacity. For 
example, although it was possible through the use of dependency theory 
to explain the back ward economic situation of emerging independent states, 
the proponents of dependency failed to formulate development strategies 
which would effectively reduce dependency ties, and thereby promote 
economic growth. 
In light of the limitations of the dependency theory, a separate line 
of argument was introduced. It examined relations between states with 
reference to what was termed interdependency. Interdependency was 
defined as "mutual dependence" by its main proponents. 30 Mutual depend-
ence exists when interactions between actors, state and non-state, involve 
lGRabert O. Keohane and Joseph S. lIye, Power and Interdependence: World Palli:ics in Transilion (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977). 
20 
reciprocal costs and benefits for all parties mvolved m transactions which 
take place under conditions of reduced autonomy. Reduced autonomy 
results from constramts on attempts to achieve goals m one area of power, 
for example either political, economic, or military, by exerting pressure 
from another area. ll Two leadIDg mterdependence theorists, R. Keohane 
and J.S. Nye, concede that no relationship exhibits pure mterdependence. 
However, they note that pure dependency does not exist either for 
relations bet ween actors display various levels of mterdependence which 
may vary over time and with different issue areas. 32 
Keohane and Nye mdicate that most mterdependence is asymmetrical, 
or that mteractions between interdependent partners m one issue area, 
such as trade, tends to favour one partner over another. The analysis of 
asymmetrical mterdependence is further broken down by these scholars 
mto "sensitivity" and "vulnerability" interdependence. The former refers 
to the speed of responsiveness by one partner to policy changes within 
another and the costliness of those policy responses within the affected 
partner.H The framework within which interaction between actors occurs 
is assumed to remam constant and is measured over a short period of time. 
Alternately, vulnerability assumes the possibility of a changing framework, 
measures policy changes over the long term, and assesses the suscepti-
bility of an actor to suffer continued externally imposed costs even though 
internal policies have been adjusted,H The application of these concepts 
3' bid' 9 "I '1 pp. 8- . 
32 Ibid.. An issue area refers to a specific area of Lllteraction, for example, trade. 
l!Ibid., p. 12. 
Hrbid 13 • " p, • 
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to the relationship bet ween South Africa and Zimbab we reveals that each 
country is sensitive to changes within the other and within the region, and 
that although Zimbabwe is vulnerable to policy changes within South Africa, 
the reverse does not seem to be the case. However, the evidence of South 
African sensitivity is adequate to challenge the dependency analysis. 
IK'll'CRDEPEKDEJlCE IK SOUTHER. AFRICA 
Although interdependency was first presented in the mid-1970s, it 
was not considered applicable to the study of southern Africa until the late 
1980s. Scholars began to re-examine the regional political, economic, and 
military dynamics in the context of interdependency.n They criticized the 
overwhelming emphasis previously placed on the dependency of the region 
upon South Africa. Dependency analysis was criticized for postulating that 
the failure of attempts by the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC)H to break dependent ties proved the total dependence 
of SADCC members upon South Africa; interdependency theorists inter-
preted this failure as demonstrating that the benefits of dependency ties 
accrued to SADCC states and the costs incurred by South Africa as a 
result of red uction of such ties were greater than previously 
believed. 
lSRonald T, Libby, The Politics at EconOll'lc Power ill Southern Africa (Pri.nceton: PriJJcet:on Ul"iversity Press, 1987), 
liThe Southern Afdcan Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was established by Angola, BotswiL'la, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe on Aprill, 1980, It's primary goals were to increase economic ties between member states while reducing 
dependence upon South Africa and the L!Jternational economic system. 
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The relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe exemplifies the 
utility of the interdependency analysis of regional relations. The 
interdependency perspective does not reject the view that Zimbabwe is 
economically linked with South Africa and that it is a victim of 
destabilization activities. However, this view is balanced by the claim that 
south Africa depends upon those links, and others within the region, and 
is not able to unilaterally control policy-making in Zimbabwe. 
Interdependency theory points to the mutual benefits accrued by both 
parties, and notes that South Africa is also sensitive to Zimbabwean 
manipulation. Furthermore, interdependency theorists examine the alleged 
relationship between economic and military pressures on the one hand, and 
political influence on the other. The dependency argument indicates a 
strong causal link between the former and the latter, thereby indicating 
that South African economic and military pressures strongly influence the 
Zimbabwean political decision-making process. The interdependency 
perspective, however, finds such linkage tenuous and argues that political 
decisions, while not immune to the influence of economic or military 
pressures, are not wholly determined by them as the dependency view 
claims. 
In 1987, Ronald Libby presented an interdependency analysis of 
southern Africa in his book The Politics of Economic Power in South,ern 
Africa.)l Libby's main assumption is that the region exhibits economic 
interdependence with, not unilateral dependence upon, the dominant 
regional economy, that of South Africa. Furthermore, he argues "that 
31 Libby, Politics of Economic Power. 
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every state in the region--including South Africa--is to some degree able 
to manipulate regional economic ties to serve its own domestic and foreign 
policy objectives and at the same time is itself affected by these 
changes."n Libby's primary criticism of the dependency approach is that 
while it recognizes South Africa's strength and resilience in the face of 
international ostracism, its "uncritical application ... has tended to stultify 
political analysis of the region."lt Moreover, studies of the region which 
focused upon South African hegemony took little notice of how regional ties 
negatively affect the Republic. Within the dependency framework, the main 
prescription for the region is that of loosening ties or I preferably I 
completely disengaging links with South Africa. Libby believes that such 
a goal is "utopian"; the accomplishment of such an end is both impossible 
and undesirable.40 
With respect to Zimbabwe, traditional scholarship has emphasized the 
political influence that South Africa exercised over this country as a 
consequence of its economic domination of the Zimbabwean economy. South 
Africa is thought to have exerted overwhelming influence over the Smith 
government, particularly during UDI. However, such an evaluation is 
challenged by the fact that Smith was a very independent actor who often 
frustrated the South African leadership.H . For example, despite intense 
South African pressures on him, Smith continually refused to agree to 
18Ibid., p. 3. 
"Ibid., p. 5. 
ulbid .. 
Hlbid .. • , p. J.J.. 
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conditions imposed by Great Britain for the granting of independence to 
Rhodesia. 
Libby offers an alternative perspective which places Zimbabwe in a 
regional context in which South Africa is an important, but not the only, 
factor in Zimbabwean policy-making. He presents Zimbabwe as holding a 
regional economic position similar to that of South Africa in that both 
states hold a trade surplus with regional trading partners (with the 
exception of trade between Zimbabwe and South Africa which is dominated 
by the latter).u Libby also notes that Zimbabwe, like South Africa, 
produces agricultural surpluses of maize and other foodstuffs which are 
exported to regional states which have become dependent upon these food 
supplies.u By demonstrating that Zimbabwe plays a regional role which 
competes against that played by South Africa, Libby reveals that strict 
dependency analysis cannot account for the dominant economic role 
Zimbabwe plays in the region. Moreover, by presenting Zimbabwe as a 
competitor to South African dominance, he raises the possibility that South 
Africa is sensitive, and conceivably vulnerable, to policy changes within 
ZimbabweY Such a postulate further challenges dependency assumptions, 
and lends greater credence to interdependency analysis. 
There are both strengths and weaknesses in The Politics of Economic 
Power. Libby's analysis of southern African relations provides a 
refreshing alternative to dependency analysis because he elucidates 
U Ibid., p. 19. 
ulbid., p. 33. 
B Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
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previously neglected characteristics of the regional relations. The 
exploration of these factors proves that a new investigation of regional 
relations is necessary since dependency evaluations are insufficient to 
explain some of the new findings. One criticism which may be made, 
however, is that in Libby's enthusiasm to present the interdependency 
view, he avoids discussion of the very real and destructive effects of 
South African sponsored violence in Zimbabwe. Although it was clearly not 
his intent to examine the evidence of this activity, consideration of 
destabilization activity within the interdependency argument could only 
have strengthened his position. 
Libby is not the only scholar who is beginning to point out South 
Africa's interdependence with, rather than dominance of, the region. 
Susanna Smith indicates that investment and trade with the region is 
crucial to the South African economy, particularly given the fact that 
South Africa is subject to intern~tional sanctions and faces increasing 
Western trade protectionism.u Stephen Lewis notes that southern Africa 
is strategically, economically and financially important for South Africa, and 
he states that n[ w]hile South Africa is undoubtedly a dominant partner in 
many respects, it benefits substantially from its economic relationships with 
the SADCC states."u Thus, he believes that interdependence is a much 
more accurate description of the relationships in the region.41 Richard 
Payne agrees that South African economic dominance is overemphasized as 
it is also reliant on states in the region, and therefore, vulnerable to any 
USusanna Smith, Frontline Africa: The Right to A Future (Oxford: Oxfam 1990), p.m. 
ustepl!en R. Lewis, Jr., The E.."OIlomics of Apartheid (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990), p. 89-90. 
uIbid .. 
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sanctions it uses against them.H Furthermore, he argues that South 
Africa's ability to use the sanctions weapon on goods or transportation is 
limited to the extent that South Africa's continued industrial growth is 
determined by its neighbours' abilities to purchase South African products 
and to use its transportation routesY Therefore, there is a degree of 
dependence which south Africa exhibits on its neighbours limiting its range 
of activities against these neighbours. A new analysis of the region, which 
takes into account south Africa's interdependence with its southern African 
neighbours, is necessary before a complete understanding of the interac-
tion between states is possible. 
COIlCLUSIOIl 
Both the dependency and interdependency perspectives have much 
to offer for the analysis of relations between states in southern Africa, 
however, neither on its own is sufficient for a complete understanding of 
the region. The dependency perspective is generally preferred by most 
scholars as it is backed up by a considerable volume of evidence. 
However, most of its advocates tend to present only one side of the 
picture. Zimbabwe is regarded to be a merely reactive state w:b..ich 
responds primarily to South African initiatives. When Zimbabwe's reaction 
does not fit the perceived South African objectives, Zimbabwe is congratu-
lated for fending off the aggressor. However, when Zimbabwe appears to 
act in the way South Africa desires, dependency ties are blamed and it is 
URichard J. Payne, The Konsullerpowers and South Africa: Implications for U.S. Pali.cy (Bloomington: Indiana University Fre«..5! 1990), p. 214. 
l'Ibid., p. 216. The potential for the SADCC states, particularly Zimbabwe, to redirect its trade traffic through ot.ier non-south !.T.ca ,at.WJ 
is of!'..en painted to as a primary reason for destabilization activity in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. 
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believed that Zimbabwe did not have an alternative course of action. This 
clearly is a very narrow reading of the complex interaction which is taking 
place between two independent states each pursuing their own best 
interests. 
Although the interdependence view presents an alternative framework 
for analysis of southern Africa which is necessary to formulate a complete 
understanding of regional economic and political relations, it is also 
insufficient for a comprehensive explanation. The fact that regional states 
are highly dependent upon South African markets and investment for 
economic growth, and that South Africa's transportation network plays a 
vital role in linking regional economies with external markets, must be 
realized for a complete understanding. Although these dependency ties 
cannot be overlooked, proponents of interdependency often do so. 
Advocates of the interdependence paradigm also encounter some practical 
methodological difficulties. Interdependency also suffers from a lack of 
obtainable new evidence. The South African government has effectively 
obscured politically sensitive statistical evidence on trade and investment 
which would prove South Africa's dependence upon the region. In 
addition, the complexity of the policy-making network in South Africa 
makes it difficult to discover links between South African policy-makers 
and those of neighbouring states. 
Having outlined the strengths and weaknesses of the dependency and 
interdependency theories as applied to southern Africa, it has become 
evident that a new analysis which takes into account aspects of both 
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perspectives is necessary. This thesis contributes to this reevaluation at 
a micro-regional level by examining the relations between Zimbabwe and 
South Africa. The relationship between these two countries may be used 
as a barometer measuring changes in the regional situation, and in the 
relations between South Africa and the southern African region as a whole. 
As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, the relationship between 
Zimbabwe and South Africa exhibits characteristics of both dependency and 
interdependency. The final conclusion which must be drawn is that only 
a conjunctive analysis applying both perspectives of inter-state relations 
can effectively explain the relationship between these two states. 
CF.IA.PTER. 3 
A Historical Review of Relations Between 
South Africa and Zimbabwe 
Present relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe reflect the 
legacy left during the colonial period, and the pattern of interaction 
established prior to the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980. A brief survey 
of the. period between 1890, the year Rhodesia was founded, and 1980 
strongly supports the application of the dependency analytical framework 
to the study of the development of relations between South Africa and 
Rhodesia. In each major era of Rhodesia's history, South Africa played a 
conspicuous, and occasionally a decisive role in Rhodesia's political and 
economic development. South Africa influenced the establishment and 
formation of Rhodesia prior to 1890 until 1923, influenced Rhodesia's 
economic development during the ninety years of its existence, and impelled 
the Rhodesian government to transfer power to the black majority to allow 
the country's independence in 1980. Furthermore, domestic affairs in 
Rhodesia mirrored policy-making in South Africa, particularly with respect 
to the domination by the minority white ruling elites in the political and 
economic arenas of both countries. Finally, linkages were established 
between the two states in the areas of investment, trade and transporta-
tion. The dominant position held by South Africa within these areas is the 
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central focus of dependency analysis since with -the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence in 1965, Rhodesia became even more dependent upon South 
Africa. 1 Dependency analysis, therefore, provides the best framework for 
understanding relations between the two states prior to 1980. 
EARLY HU'fORY UR'fIL 1923 
The history of the European presence in southern Africa began with 
the discovery of the Cape sea route by Portuguese explorers in the 
fifteenth century.) It was not until 1652, however, that a permanent white 
settlement was established at the Fort de Goede Hoop by the Dutch East 
India company. The Company had little interest in governing the 
settlement or in promoting its expansion. Nevertheless, the original Dutch 
settlement grew very quickly through immigration and natural increase. 
Crowded conditions, which ensued as settlers adopted pastoralism and 
became farmers, caused many of the farmers, or Boers,' to move into the 
interior of the continent. 
As the Boers spread out from the Cape they came into greater 
contact with the African populations in the area. Initial contacts with the 
lRhodesia, as a colony of Great Britain, was fairly dependent upon the British market and upon British inputs. However, its political autonomy 
and peripheral position in the British Empire lessened Rhodesia's dependence upon Brilain as compared with other British colonies such as Zambia. 
) The histarical backqround information was compiled from the following sources: Donald Denoon, Southern Africa since 1800 (London: Longman 
Group Ltd., 1972); John E. Flint, ed., The cambridge History of Africa, vol. 5 (cambridge: cambridge University Press, 1976); L.H. Gann, A History 
of Southern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1934 (London: Chatto and ltindus, 1965); C.P.S. Muller, ed., Five B1.Dldred Years: A History of South Africa 
(Pretoria: H&R Academia, 1969); A.J. Wills, An Introduction to the History of Central Africa: Zambia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1985); Moura Wilson and Leonard Thompson, eds., The Oxford History of South Africa, vol. 1: South Africa to 1870 (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1969). 
3The Boers were Afrikaners, a new ethnic qroup which emerged in southern Africa, spoke Afrikaans (a derivation of Dutch), and became the 
dominant white group in South Africa. 
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Khoi, San and Xhosa people in the coastal areas were friendly, however, 
relations between the European and indigenous peoples soon dissolved as 
a result of different cultural expectations and values. Moreover, the 
Afrikaners developed attitudes of racial superiority which were reinforced 
with the importation of slaves for farm labour, and all Africans came to be 
seen as "an alien feeble community, deficient in technology, military 
strength and the attributes of western civilization."t Despite evidence to 
the contrary, these racial attitudes characterized all interaction with the 
blacks, and was institutionalized in the establishment of the apartheid 
system in the early 1900s. 
British influence in southern Africa began in earnest in the late 
1700s, and the end of the Napoleonic wars brought the Cape colony under 
permanent British rule in 1806. By this time a distinct Afrikaner culture 
had emerged, and Afrikaners saw themselves as a truly African people and 
the rightful occupants of the territory which comprised southern Africa.s 
They viewed the British as imperialists who threatened the Afrikaner way 
of life and position in Africa. Thus, British control resulted in a further 
movement of the Afrikaner population into the interior, which in turn 
increased conflict with the African tribes.' 
(Donald Denoon, Southern Africa sim:e 1800, p. 13. 
5CaIin Vale, "South Africa and Zimbabwe: Too Close for Comfort," South Africa International, vol 12, no. 2 (October 1981) p. 360. 
'Eric A. lialker gives a very interesting account of the African tribes in southern Africa, the conflict between them, and conflict with the 
Afrikaners in A History of Southern Africa, 3rd Ed. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957). A shorter me recent version is presented by Denoon 
in Southern Africa since 1800. The major Boer migration, known as the Great Trek, is chronicled in S. Patterson, The Last Trek: A study of the 
Boer pgle and the Afrikaner Nation (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957). 
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Initially, the British were content to remam along the coast and 
limited their activity in the interior of the continent. It was not until the 
mid -1800s that the British began an earnest quest for colonies in southern 
Africa. One of the primary catalysts for this movement was the discovery 
of mineral wealth in the northern part of South Africa and the belief that 
the area to the north, later known as Southern Rhodesia, was also rich in 
gold.' The quest north was led by Cecil Rhodes, a South African based 
British imperialist with a dream of British domination from "Cairo to the 
Cape" and a nose for economic gam! In 1888, Rhodes' partner Charles 
Rudd convinced Lobengue1a, the chief of the Ndebele tribe, to grant to the 
British in the Rudd concession, the mineral rights of his land known as 
Zambesia (which included all of Matabeleland up to the Zambezi river and 
Mashonaland). Rhodes was then granted the territory by the British 
government to be administered under the British South Africa Company.' 
Beginning in 1890 Rhodesia, which was named after its founder, was 
governed by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) which had been 
created by Cecil Rhodes. The British were initially unenthusiastic about 
Rhodes' expansion into the interior of the continent. Nevertheless, the 
territory was colonized as a result of three factors: the "scramble for 
T Colin Leys, European PaJitics in Southern Rhodesia, p. 5. 
'Arthur Keppel-Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia: The White Conquest of Zimbabwe 1884-1902 (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University 
Press, 1983), pp. 25-26; Wills, History of Central Africa, pp. 124-25. 
'tHo Gann, A History of Southern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1934, pp.74-83; D.H. Schreuder, The Scramble for Southern Africa, 1877-1895: The 
Politics of Partition Reappraised (cambridge: cambridge University Press, 198O) pp. 219-226. For further elaboration of the people involved and 
the reasons behind the Rudd ConcessiDn and the establishment of southern Rhodesia consult Arthur Keppel-Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia. 
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Africa" which was taking place at the end of the 1800S;10 the discovery 
of mineral wealth in northern Transvaal which raised hopes of a similar 
discovery further north; and Rhodes' own imperialist dreams for British 
domination in AfricaY The hoped for mineral wealth never materialized, 
and Rhodes' dream was never fulfilled, but Rhodesia became important to 
the British for another reason--as a bulwark against Afrikaner 
expansionism. 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Afrikaners in South Africa 
were becoming a dominant force in the region and challenged Britain's 
influence. Moreover, the Afrikaners viewed British north ward expansion 
as a threat to their self-determination and as an infringement on territory 
they believed was rightfully theirs. Tensions grew between the Afrikaner 
states and the British resulting in the Anglo-Boer War in 1899. The two 
Boer republics, the Transvaal and Orange Free state, were defeated by the 
British in 1902 and became colonies. However, within the next five years 
they were granted responsible government, and in 1910 they joined 
together with the Cape Colony and Natal to form the Union of South 
AfricaY 
With the formation of the Union, British influence decreased 
dramatically. The Afrikaners had never accepted British rule and resented 
10 The scramble for Afri.ca generally refers to the division at Africa mmg the European powers which took place during the 1880s. Denoon, 
Southern Africa Stice 1000, p. 74. 
llHerbert J. Spiro, "The Rhodesias and lfyasaland," in Five African states: Responses to Diversity, Gwendolen M. carter, ed. (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 365. 
12 Thomas Karis, "South Africa/I in Five African states: Responses to Diversity, ed. Gwendolen M. carter (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1963) p. 475. 
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British interference in their relations with the indigenous people. 
Moreover, the goals of both states were completely different. South Africa 
was primarily concerned with national survival, while Great Britain was 
mainly interested in consolidating its empire for economic purposes. Yet 
with the formation of the Union, provision was left for the future 
incorporation of the British southern African possessions, the High 
Commission Territories and Rhodesia. U 
ijhen the British South Africa Company's mandate expired in 1922, 
the British government decided that the future of Rhodesia would be 
determined through a referendum by the Rhodesian electorate. In keeping 
with colonial policies at the time, this electorate was comprised primarily 
of whites, although a few blacks did qualify--14,700 and 60 respectively.14 
Two options were presented in the referendum: (1) to become part of the 
Union of South Africa (the option favoured by both South Africa and Great 
Britain); or (2) to proceed to self-governing status with responsible 
government. The final vote was 5,989 for joining the Union, and 8,744 for 
responsible government.1S Thus, on 1 October 1923 Southern Rhodesia was 
born after rejecting political union with its southern neighbour. In voting 
U Denoon, Southern Africa since 1800, p.llO. The lIiqh Commission Territories included BechuanaIand, BasutaJand, and Swaziland were British 
ProtWrates. The British assumed that they would eventually be incorporated into the Union of South Africa until the victory of the National Party 
and the imposilion of apartheid in that country made such a move unacceptable to the indigenous people, the British and the international community. 
Jack Halpern, MBotswana-Recent History," Africa South of the Sahara 1990 (London: Europa Publicatians Ltd., 1989) p. 269. 
HHoward Simson, Zimbabwe: A Country study, Research Report no. 53 (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African studies, 1979) p. 14. The 
minimum qualifi.cat:ions to be eligible to vote was "the ability to complEte the application form, and the occupation of a house valued at £[150] or the 
receipt of an ineaD! of [one hundred} pounds a year.N Wills, History of Central Africa, p. 206. 
15 Leys, European Palilics in Southern Rhodesia. p. 13. 
! 
35 
for responsible government, the new state of Rhodesia technically became 
a British colony, although constitutionally it was a 'self-governing' one. 
This meant that the British government maintained 'reserve powers', and 
could interfere in the internal politics of Rhodesia whenever it desired. 
However, the British rarely did this. 
The decision for self-government by the Rhodesians was not 
necessarily a foregone conclusion given the similar racial attitudes in 
Rhodesia and South Africa, and the increasingly dominant position held by 
the latter in the Rhodesian economy. In Rhodesia similar attitudes towards 
the Africans existed, and legislative developments followed much the same 
path as in South Africa. The most obvious similarity was with regard to 
land distribution. In both Rhodesia and South Africa, the best land was 
reserved for white occupation and use, while the Africans were restricted 
to marginal, unproductive soil. This had the effect of creating a vast 
black labour force which could be employed at very low pay in unskilled 
positions in industry and miningY 
Three factors may be identified which undermined prospects for 
unification between South Africa and Rhodesia. First, the Rhodesians, who 
were primarily of British descent, were worried about losing their identity 
in a firmly established Afrikaner society in South Africa. Neither the 
settlers nor the British South Africa Company cherished the prospect of 
rule by the Afrikaners: "Rhodesians themselves, as their adverse vote in 
16Denoon, Southern Africa since 1800, p. lll; Roger Martin, Southern Africa: The Price of Apartheid. A Poli.ticaI Risk Analysis. Spe::ia] Report 
No. 1130 (London: The Economic Intelligence Unit, 1988), p. 19. 
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the 1923 referendum made clear, looked with considerable misgivings on the 
prospects of closer political ties with what appeared to be an alien anti-
British group."l1 Secondly, the Rhodesians were fearful of becoming a 
secondary province in the Union. Remaining independent of the Union 
would help the British population to maintain their identity and would allow 
separate economic and cultural development. Finally, "until perhaps the 
1950s, there seemed to be no imminent risk of the Imperial Government 
failing to defend the settlers against African aspirations."U By the time 
it was realized that Africanisation was inevitable, "it was too late to 
establish links with the Union, and impossible to reverse the trends of the 
previous half century. "u 
The vote for self-government by the Rhodesian's reflected the 
changing regional setting in southern Africa. Firstly, the results revealed 
the further demise of British influence in South Africa. Great Britain had 
hoped that the Rhodesians would approve union with South Africa since its 
population was primarily English speaking. Britain presumed that as such 
the Rhodesians would represent British interests in South Africa. As for 
the Rhodesians, the fact that they were English and wanted to protect 
their culture from being engulfed by Afrikaner nationalism was the primary 
concern which shaped their decision to opt for self-government.20 
Secondly, the referendum reflected British and Rhodesian fears of the 
increasing regional influence of South Africa. The fact that both the 
17 J.E. Spence, N'l'radition and Change in South African Foreign Palicy,M Journal of commonwealth and Polit:ical studies I, 2 (May 1962), p. 138. 
11 Denoon, Southern Africa &nce 1800, p. 166. 
uIbid.. Africanisatian refers to the acquisition of power and control of government by the indigenous black Africans. 
2oIbid., p. 163. 
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British and Rhodesians were concerned about South African expansion and 
dorrrination indicated that the largest state in southern Africa was a force 
which had to be respected. Finally, the outcome established the ambiguous 
relationship which characterized relations between South Africa and 
Rhodesia up to independence in 1980, and even to the present. Although 
the Rhodesians jealously guarded their political independence from South 
Africa, economic integration was not limited nor was the adoption of 
institutional arrangements based on South African models of racial . i 
separation and white dorrrination. 21 
Although Rhodesia avoided becorrring a formal adjunct of the South 
African state, it could not escape becoming a de facto province of its 
neighbour in economic terms. South African involvement in the Rhodesian 
economy was already very substantial by the time of the referendum, as 
a result of the activities of the South African based British South Africa 
Company which governed the territory until the referendum. In addition, 
from the beginning, Rhodesia's economy was trade oriented, and South 
Africa was an important partner, although not as important as it would 
become later. This early involvement by South Africa in the Rhodesian 
economy established the foundations of Rhodesia's later dependence on 
South Africa. 
2l Larry Bowman, Michael Bratton and Rukudo Ifurapa, "Zimbabwe and South Africa: Dependency, IlesI:abilizati and Liberation/A in Thomas H. 
caD.aqhy ed. South Africa in Southern Africa: The In_Jill; Vortex of Violence (Hew York: Praeqer Publishers, 1983) pp. 326-27. 
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FROH SELI'-GoVERRHER'!' '!'O ILLEGAL IRDEPERDE.CE, 1923-1965 
During the period between 1923 and the early 1960s, relations 
between the two countries appear to have been fairly stable and unremark-
able. Economic interaction continued and South African investment held an 
important, although not dominant, position within the Rhodesian economy. 
Other events were transpiring at the international and regional levels, 
however, which shaped policy-making in Rhodesia and South Africa and 
influenced relations between the two countries in 1965 and the years that 
followed. 
At the international level, the first wave of nationalism by non-whites 
in the colonized areas was taking hold and many colonial territories were 
gaining independence. The major colonial powers in Africa, such as Great 
Britain, France and Belgium, emerged from the Second World War consider-
ably weakened and unable to continue administrating their colonial empires. 
This, combined with rising nationalism in the colonies, led to a gradual 
dismantling of these empires. The gaining of independence by India in 
1949 and Ghana in 1957 provided the impetus and encouragement for the 
emergence of independence groups in many Africa territories, and within 
the twenty years following the war, many of them had gained indepen-
dence. 
In both South Africa and Rhodesia, white nationalism was gaining 
strength as was demonstrated by the first election victory of the Afrikaner 
National Party (ANP) under Dr. Daniel Malan in 1948 in South Africa, and 
39 
the consolidation of power under Dr. Godfrey Huggins, leader of the 
governing United Party in Rhodesia.22 Under Dr. Malan, the government 
legalized the policy of apartheid. This policy, which literally meant 
'apartness', had been a feature of South Africa's domestic policies since the 
1913 Native Lands Act, and was characterized by the segregation of whites 
and blacks. However, under the ANP, apartheid was entrenched through 
legislation such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949, and the 
Population Registration Act in 1950.23 The idea of apartheid was further 
consolidated by Prime Minister Hendrick Verwoerd, who articulated the 
ideology of 'aparte ontwikke1ing' (separate deve1opment).H In theory, this 
meant that blacks and whites would follow their own paths for political and 
economic development, but in practice it meant that whites would develop 
at the expense of the blacks. 
In Rhodesia, the United Party followed a similar policy called the 
'double pyramid'. This policy was entrenched by the Land Apportionment 
Act of 1931, the Industrial Conciliation Act (1934), the Native Registration 
Act (1936), and the Native Passes Act (1937).25 Set against a background 
of increasing black power in Africa, the racist policies of the South African 
and Rhodesian governments did not foreshadow a promising future for the 
relations of these two countries with the rest of the continent. 
22 Huggins formed the united Party in 1933 when disputes arose aag members of the Reform Party which he was leader of over a new railways 
bill which appeared to favour the main companies in Rhodesia, namely BSAC and its subSdiaries. The primary aims of Huggins were to "intensify 
white immiqration, widen the sector of secondary industry, and wrest from the Imperial Government as much further independence as was possihle 
short of dominion status. M Furthermore, he perceived the European _y in Rhodesia to be a white "island in a sea of black," and intended that 
it remain so. Wills, History of CentxaI Africa, pp. 254-55. 
HUH. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History, 3rd ed. ('l'oronto: University of 'l'oronto Press, 1987), pp. 361-3. 
2 (Ibid., p. 375. 
25 Wills, History of Centxal Africa, pp. 253-54. 
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In both South Africa and Rhodesia the rapid decolonization of Africa 
was viewed with a great deal of concern and posed a considerable policy 
dilemma. In South Africa, the Afrikaners were uncomfortable with the 
myriad of black states emerging to the north and apprehensive of the 
effects this might have on black nationalist movements within South Africa. 
The main goal of the ANP government, therefore, was to strengthen white 
control within South Africa, to increase South African influence throughout 
the rest of Africa, and to carve out a sphere of influence in which South 
Africa would assert a leadership role. 26 More specifically, South African 
policy-makers had three central objectives during the 1950s and early 
1960s which were: 
1. The maintenance of friendly relations with other African territories. 
2. The search for status in the British Empire and Commonwealth. 
3. The incorporation of the three High Commission territories: Basutoland, 
Bechuanaland and Swaziland.!f 
The South African government was unable to achieve any of these 
objectives. 
The first objective failed because the new states of Africa had 
struggled to free themselves from white oppression and were not amicable 
towards a white dominated country.a In 1961 South Africa's search for 
status in the Commonwealth ended when it was forced to withdraw as a 
result of pressure from the increasing number of black states within the 
organization. Finally, the High Commission territories of Basutoland, 
2iJames Barber and John Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Search for status and Security 1945-1988 (cambridge: cambridge 
University Press, 1990) pp. 18-19, 115. 
21 J.E. Spence, "'fradition and Change,· p. 136. 
21South Africa was soundly condemned for its racist policies by the Orqanisation of African Unity, formed in 1963. In addition, JOOSt African 
states, with the exception of Malawi, cut official diplomatic ties with South Africa. 
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Bechuanaland and Swaziland became the independent states of Lesotho in 
1966, Botswana (1966) and Swaziland (1968). 
with the failure of these policy objectives, the necessity of 
readjusting its foreign policy focus became evident to the South African 
government. The articulation of the new policy had two aspects--political 
and economic. The primary political concern was the maintenance of a 
white buffer zone, or cordon sanitaire, which separated South Africa from 
the march of black nationalism." The potential 'destructive' effects of 
this movement was made evident by the government's reaction to the 
internal crisis during the 1960s which saw violence in the black townships. 
Rather than see the black uprising in townships, such as Sharpeville, as 
rebellion against the imposed apartheid system, President Verwoerd blamed 
"subversive outside influences: liberalism, multiracialism, [and] commu-
nism," for the demonstrations which took place~3t To counter these 
external influences, the South African government gave greater support to 
the white ruled Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, and to 
Rhodesia. 
Economically, the South African government was interested in 
increasing trade ties with other states in southern Africa and the 
continent. South Africa had already cultivated close economic ties with its 
2 'The cordon sanit:aire was comprised of Rhodesia and the Portuguese coIonies-Hombique and Angola. 
so Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Folic)", p. 90. The Sharpevi1le deJoonstration was one of a number caIried out by the African 
National Congress (AlIe) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1960 as part of a campaign to protest against the 'pass laws' which regulated the 
JOOVellleIlts of Africans within South Africa. This particular demnstntim!, which outraged internatianal opinion, was marked by South African police 
shooting the IIIIarEd crowd which had surrounded the statiDn. The South African qovernment responded by banning the AlIC and PAC. J.n Omer-
Cooper, "South Africa-History," Africa South of the Sahara 1990, p. 904. 
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immediate neighbours, the High Commission Territories, when together they 
had formed the South African Customs Union (SACU) in 1902. By the 
1950s, South Africa was seeking to increase trade ties with other states in 
the region and the continent. This emphasis on economic cooperation 
became an important characteristic of South Africa's foreign policy, and by 
1964 Verwoerd was advancing the concept of a 'co-prosperity sphere' which 
would include all states in southern Africa. It was hoped that increased 
economic cooperation would result in legitimization of South Africa's 
internal situation. By promoting the political and economic objectives, the 
South African government was attempting to maintain white domination 
within South Africa, while encouraging economic interaction with black 
states which were antagonistic towards South Africa's domestic policy. 
The decolonization of Africa also posed a policy dilemma for the 
Rhodesian government. As in South Africa, the consolidation of white 
dominance within Rhodesia was a government priority. When in 1953 
Britain created the Central African Federation (CAF), which joined Rhodesia 
(Southern), Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in an economic union, 
problems quickly arose as a result of the racial policies which the 
Rhodesian government espoused,u From the beginning Rhodesia was the 
dominant partner. In 1954, it accounted for 49 per cent of the Federa-
tion's GNP, while Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland accounted for 42 and 
9 per cent respectively.12 Its economy also attracted the most foreign 
31 Arthur Hulewood, "?he Economics of Federation and Dissolutim in Central Africa,N in Arthur Hazlewood ed. African Integration and 
Disintegration (Oxford: Olford University Press, 1967). ?his is an excellent overview of the economics and politics of the CAF. For more in depth 
coverage of the paJitjcs durinq federation see AJ. lIills, History of Central Africa. pp. 326-46. 
S2Hazlewood, "?he economics of federation and dissalutim,N p. 195. 
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investment from Britain and elsewhere, dominated in manufacturing and 
became the most diversified." The two northern territories, which had 
been brought into the federation reluctantly, resented the economic 
imbalance which was occurring, although they were receiving some economic 
benefits from it.H Even more, however, they abhorred the domination of 
the whites and the racial policies being implemented in Rhodesia while they 
were struggling for independence.S5 Thus, the federation was dissolved 
in 1963, and independence for Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia followed 
shortly thereafter with Nyasaland becoming Malawi on 6 July 1964, and 
Northern Rhodesia becoming Zambia on 24 October that same year. 
Rhodesia, on the other hand, was not granted independence because 
of its racial policies. Consequently, the government of Rhodesia, under Ian 
Smith, declared independence illegally in 1965. This decision of the Smith 
government resulted in the isolation of Rhodesia by black Africa, and 
caused Rhodesia to build closer ties with South Africa. 
UDI: DBCLARAUO. '1'0 '!'DB POR'I'UGUZSB COUP, 1965-1974 
Ian Smith's illegal Unilateral Declaration of Independence on 11 
November 1965 brought his country into a closer relationship with South 
Africa than had ever been imagined by those who had rejected the Union 
proposal in 1923. H Smith justified his action by claimin g that the 
H1bid .. 
H Spiro, "The Rhodesias and X yasaland, H p. 367. 
HIbid .. 
U A very interesting account of the first years of UDI before the Portuquese coup is offered in Robert C. Good, U .DJ. The International Palil:ics 
of the Rhodesian Rebellion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). 
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Rhodesians deserved to be independent since they had been self-governing 
since 1923 and had a strong economy. The government in London, 
however, declared the move illegal, refused recognition, called for the 
immediate imposition of sanctions, and appealed to the United Nations for 
similar measures to be implemented by the international community. 
Although within Rhodesia the whites were jubilant, Rhodesian blacks 
and most of the rest of the world denounced the action. The membership 
of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Third World members of the 
Commonwealth condemned the action and protested against what they felt 
was aD: inadequate British response. 
The notable exception to the prevailing international sentiment 
against the Rhodesian government was South Africa. The South African 
response to UDI was cautious, neither condemning nor supporting the 
Rhodesian move. Nevertheless, South Africa's stance towards the Smith 
government had important consequences for relations between the two 
states, which became closer during the UDI period. In October 1965, South 
Africa's Foreign Affairs Minister Dr. Muller announced that South Africa 
would not interfere should Rhodesia decide to declare independence 
unilaterally: "This is a matter which only concerns Rhodesia. south 
Africa's policy is not to interfere in other countries' affairS."31 Most 
importantly, the South African government declared that it would not 
impose sanctions against the Rhodesians. Only one year earlier, Smith had 
"South Africa Digest, 29 October 1965, p. 2. Quoted in Gail-Maryse cailiam, Vorster's Foreign Policy (Pretoria: H&R Academica (pty.) Ltd., 
1987) p. 176. 
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secured a trade agreement with South Africa. which provided for the 
lowering of tariff barriers between the two countries.sa When Rhodesia's 
largest trading partner, Great Britain, announced that it was imposing 
sanctions, a closer economic link between Rhodesia and South Africa was 
inevitable. Thus, with the South African government's position clearly 
stated, Smith was able to feel confident of the neutrality, if not support 
for his decision, of South Africa, even though South African president 
Verwoerd had apparently advised against such action in private." 
Whether or not Smith had reason to believe that South Africa would 
continue to support UDI is difficult to determine. Policy statements from 
Pretoria on regional policy immediately following UDI were very ambiguous. 
UDI was not really welcomed by the South African government as it would 
cause regional instability, and put Pretoria in an awk ward position with i 
respect to its relations with other African governments}O Nevertheless, 
on 25 January 1966, Verwoerd outlined the principles of South African 
foreign policy which would be applied at this time: 
[WJe do not allow interference in our own matters, and if we do not allow 
such interference then we should not interfere in those of others. [Second-
ly, J since we have been threatened over and over again with, and to a certain 
extent have experienced, boycotts and sanctions, we have taken up the clear 
attitude that under no circumstances, neither under pressure nor under force, 
will we participate in either boycotts or sanctions. 41 
Smith apparently perceived this to mean that South Africa supported his 
action and would continue to do so.n 
UCrlram, Vorm's Foreign PoIicL p. 175. 
I 'Verwoerd is said to have observed, "I have offered advice to three Rhodesian premiers. The first tiro were wise enough to take it. H Quoted 
in Good, U .DJ., p. 21 
40 Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p. 136. 
4lSouth Africa, House of Assembly, Debates, 25 January 1966, coIs. 51-2, 54. Quated in Clx:mm, Verm's Foreign Pa!icy, pp. 176,177. 
H Hills, History of Central Africa, p. 373. 
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The main impetus behind Smith's action was, ironically, similar to that 
of the other African states seeking independence: to be free of colonial 
rule. Although Britain maintained the right to interfere in domestic policy 
in Rhodesia, it had never exercised that right. In 1961 Britain had 
provided Rhodesia with a new constitution in which it reduced its limited 
powers even further, but maintained control over foreign policy and 
"retained formal legal right to interfere in the internal affairs" of 
RhodesiaY The residual powers which remained, however, were disquiet- .1 
ing to the whites who felt that the time had come for their country's 
complete independence, as it had been self-governing since 1923. The 
white Rhodesians were also suspicious of Britain's desire to see African 
states reach majority rule, which was an extremely distasteful objective in 
a society where the well-being of the white minority was sustained by an 
exploited black majority. 
Neither Smith nor the South African government were comfortable 
with the idea of majority rule in Rhodesia. Smith held the belief that the 
fate of Rhodesia and South Africa were inextricably interwoven and "that 
to accept the principle of majority rule for one would spell disaster for 
both."H Similarly, Verwoerd held the opinion that, 
most South Africans believed that should Black supremacy be established in 
Rhodesia or placed in the offing, it would damage the peace and harmony in 
Southern Africa, lead to economic deterioration and unemployment, and create 
either distress or danger on South Africa's border--over and above the 
disaster which the white Rhodesian would suffer. 45 
Uto:_ ~:_I...l.. 15. iJlIIlIIUIl,~P· 
H Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Pa!icy, p. 216. 
uCo:kram, Vorster's foreign pa1icy, p. 178. 
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However, both South African presidents, Verwoerd and Vorster, thought 
declaring independence unilaterally ill-advised. Nevertheless, they were 
more concerned with ensuring that sanctions against Rhodesia would fail, 
thereby preventing their application to South Africa.4' The border 
between the two countries therefore remained open, and Rhodesia was able 
to withstand the pressure of sanctions, which had at any rate been half-
heartedly imposed. 
By turning to South Africa for support in its attempt to dislodge 
itself from British control, the Rhodesian government created a second 
irony of UDI. As Johnson and Martin point out, "although [UDI] temporar-
ily severed formal ties with Britain, it increasingly reduced the country to 
the status of a colony or province of South Africa."n As UDI continued, 
Rhodesian dependence on its southern neighbour in the areas of trade, 
in vestment, and later transportation grew as South Africa became its 
lifeline.u UDI, therefore, was instrumental in deepening Rhodesia's 
dependency on South Africa, and set the ground work for future relations 
between the two states. 
RHODBSIA ARD DBPBRDBRCT: FROII GRBA'!' BRI'!'AIR '1'0 500'l'B AFRICA 
As table I shows, trade between the two countries at the time of UDI, 
although not large, was still important for Rhodesia. In 1965, 25.3 percent 
29. 
"Colin Legum, The Battlefronts of Southern Africa (Ie" York: Africana Publishinq Company, 1988) p. 143. 
U Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, Frontline Southern Africa: Destructive Engagement, p. 88. 
uLee Cokorinos, "'l'he Political Economy of state and Party Formation in Zimbabwe," in The PoIiticaI Economy of Zimbabwe, ed. Scbatzberq, p. 
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Table I: Rhodesia's Trade with South Africa 1964-1971 
(US$ millions) 
Ym 1m 1m 1m la§I me 1m 1~1Q 1m 
GNP US$ mil- 926.80 1,015.0 1,003.8 1,092.0 1,113.2 1,344.0 1,482.6 1,104.7 
Exports Z$ 274.9 322.8 200.0 194,4 187.8 231.9 264.6 287.7 
Exports US$ 384.B6 451.92 280.00 212.16 262.92 324.66 370.44 403.99 
to SA US$ 2B.l 41.5 nla BO.O· 80 85 95 90 
~ of Total 7.30 10.51 nla 29.39 30.43 26.18 25.65 22.28 
hf~e 3,Q3 US D,DO 1.33 fi.gZ fi.32 UI 5.Z8 
Imports Z$ 216.6 239.6 169.5 181.1 207.1 199.5 235.0 282.5 
Imports US$ 303.24 335.44 231.30 261. 94 289.94 219.30 329.00 396.69 
from SA US$ 15.1 71.6 160' 
Note: Import values for 1966 and 1968-1979 are not avail Ie. Neither are export va ues or 1972-1979. 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 1916; "Rhodesia," Africa Contemporary 
record. 1968-69, exports to and imports from south Africa for 1964 and 1965; Kichael Parsonage and Michael Williams, 
"Britain and Rhodesia: The economic background to sanctions," Wor Id Today 29, 9 (September 1913) p. 381, exports 
to South Africa 1967-71. 
of Rhodesia's exports went to Zambia, while 21.9 per cent went to Britain." 
South Africa by comparison only received 10.5 per cent.50 In terms of 
imports, South Africa supplied 23 per cent and Britain 30 per centY With 
the imposition of sanctions, however, the proportions changed dramatically 
as trade was directed away from Great Britain and Rhodesia's neighbours 
towards South Africa. By 1967 South Africa was both Rhodesia's largest 
supplier of imports, and most important export market making Rhodesia 
highly dependent upon its neighbour for its continued economic survival.52 
Although comprehensive statistics for this period are unavailable, Table I 
U"Rhodesia," Africa Contemporary Record 1968-69, ed. Colin Lequm (Ifew York: Africana Publishing Company,l969), p. 386. 
50 InternatimJai Monetary Fund, InternatimJai Financial statistics, 1976. 
SIRobert Davies, "Foreign rtade and EIternal Economic ReIat:ions," in CaIin stoneman, ed., Zimbabwe's Inheritance (!few York: st. Martin's Press, 
1981) p. 20L 
s2Davies, "Foreign rrade and EIternal Economic ReIat:ions," p. 20L 
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shows that exports to South Africa tripled between 1965 and 1967, and they 
remained above twenty percent of Rhodesia's total exports over the 
following years of UDI. 
Table II: Rhodesia's Top Ten Industrials, 1970 
Company Tota I Assets 
* Rhodesian Breweries 30.85 
* Hippo Valley Estates 25.68 
* Rhodes i a Cement 10 • 33 
BAT 8.65 
Rhodesia Sugar 8.52 
* Pr~ier Portland Cement 7.68 
Sal isbury Portland Cement 1.40 
Rhodesia Tea 6.84 
* Plate Glass 6.14 
Johnson and F I etcher 5.12 
* Wholly or Partly South African controned. 
Source: John Sprack, Rhodesia: South Africa's Sixth Province, 56. Rand values in original source have been 
converted at 1910 exchange rate R=1.3959US$. 
Investment from South Africa, which had been substantial prior to 
UDI, also increased to command a greater market share. Before UDI 
foreign capital shares were dominated by the British (60 per cent), South 
Africa (33 per cent) and the United states (5 per cent).H By 1979, forty-
three South African subsidiaries were in Zimbabwe and five of the top ten 
companies were controlled by or associated with South African companies 
(See Table II). In addition, many other South African companies had gone 
off-shore to assume a different corporate identity and to project a better 
UCoIin stoneman and Rob Davies, "The EconOll\y: An OVerview," in caIin stoneman, ed., Zimbabwe's Inheritance, US. 
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public image. It is estimated that approximately 119 out of 150 British 
companies had holdings which may have originated in South Africa.H This 
makes the actual South African share impossible to determine; however, it 
is accurate to assume that it increased substanti.a11y during UDI.n 
Increased in vestment originating from South Africa further reinforced 
Rhodesia's growing dependence upon that country. 
The third area of interaction, transportation, did not become a major 
aspect of the relationship between the two countries until the collapse of 
Portuguese colonial rule in 1974. Portugal had also refused to impose 
sanctions on Rhodesia, and Mozambique, a Portuguese colony, was 
Rhodesia's primary transportation route to the international market. The 
main rail lines used by Rhodesia were those to Beira and Maputo. Before 
1974, 80 per cent of Rhodesia's trade traffic went through Mozambique, but, 
in 1976 the new Frente de Liberta~a de M~ambique (FRELIMO) government 
closed the borders." This forced the diversion of traffic through South 
Africa. A line across the Beit Bridge to Durban was built, and by 1979 100 
per cent of Rhodesia's rail traffic went through South Africa, making 
Rhodesia totally dependent upon the South African Transport Services 
(SATS) for the movement of its goods. The redirection of the South Africa 
oriented transportation system now poses difficulties for the post-
Sf John SpriCk, RhadeSa: South Africa's Sixth Province (London: InternationalllefeDce and Aid Fund, 1974), p. 56. 
55Pauline R. Baker, "Palitical risk assessment: Contrasting PerspWves of Zimbabwe," in Michael G. SchaWlerg, ed., 'rhe PaIitical Economy of 
Zimbabwe (Bew York: Praeqer, 1984) pp.166-167; Simson, Zimbabwe, p. 43. stoneman and Davies estimate that the British and South African shares 
together were worth US$l,OOO million in 19OO. stoneman and Davies, "!be Bt'onoIIy, M p. ill. 
u'l'he PRELIMO government was opposed to white dominatim and had just fought its own independence struggle against Portuguese rule. 
Mozambique joined the rest of the African communiJ:y in imposing sana against Rhodesia. 
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independence government which is attempting to reduce this dependence 
upon South Africa. 
As a result of the increased dependence of Rhodesia on South Africa, 
sanctions were not entirely disruptive of Rhodesia's economy. Not only did 
Rhodesia find alternative sources for investment and manufacturing inputs, 
it also became more self-reliant. As Howard Simson argues, "sanctions led 
to a successful reorientation of economic policy towards 'self-reliance'. ,,51 I 
This reorientation was most clearly seen in the manufacturing sector, which 
although already well developed, increased its contribution to the GOP from 
17 per cent in 1966 to 24 per cent in 1974.u Even though most of the 
economic inputs required for this sector came from South Africa, "[a]t 
independence, thanks to the trade embargo during the UDI years, Zimbabwe 
inherited the most developed economy among the Front Line states. flU 
Nevertheless, the primary impact of sanctions was the increased integration 
of the Rhodesian and South African economies, and the heightened 
dependence of the former on the latter. It is these links which have led 
scholars to argue that South African-Zimbabwean relations may be 
characterised as a core-periphery relationship. 
5 J Simson, Zimbabwe. p. 15. 
51David llield, "Manufacturing Industry," in Colin stoneman, ed., Zimbabwe's Inheritance, p. 155. 
uKquyuru H.I. Lipumba, "'he state of the EconollDes of the Front Line states and the Liberation strugq1ein Southern Africa," in Ibrahim S.R. 
Msabaha and Timthy K. Shaw, eds., Confrontation and LiheratiDn in Southern Africa: Regional Directions after the lkomati Accord (Boulder, co: 
lIestview Press, 1987) p. 81. The Pront Line states, compriSng Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia, Angola and Mosambique, had been formed in 1974 to aid 
the freedom struqqle of the Zimbabwe natianalist forces. 
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Relations between the two countries changed once again with the 
overthrow of the Portuguese government and the independence of 
Portugal's colonies in southern Africa, Angola and Mozambique. The new 
regional setting which resulted forced a revision of South Africa's policy 
towards Rhodesia. As was demonstrated above, the relationship between 
the two states had become closer as a result of sanctions being imposed 
on Rhodesia, and as a result of South Africa's desire to maintain white 
domination in southern Africa. With the independence of Angola and 
Mozambique the cordon sanitaire was shattered, making the white regime 
in Rhodesia a political and military burden for the South African govern-
ment. The South Africans were attempting to engage in a detente initiative 
with their newly independent neighbours and were trying to present a 
good public image as a supporter of black independence. However, the 
South African government's continued support for the Smith regime 
blatantly contradicted its pretensions and frustrated its ambitions for 
regional leadership. 
As UDI dragged on and negotiation after negotiation ended in failure, 
South Africa came under increasing pressure from the United States and 
Great Britain to use its dominant position with respect to Rhodesia to impel 
Smith to reach a settlement. The South African government itself was 
becoming increasingly disenchanted with the illegality of UDI, the 
intransigence of Smith, and the constant world attention focused on the 
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region; it perceived that a reorientation of regional policy was necess-
ary." Moreover, the regional situation had changed with the emergence 
of Marxist governments in both Angola and Mozambique bringing the 
'communist threat' closer to the South African borders. In addition, the 
Movimento Popular de Liberta~ao de Angola (MPLA) government in Angola 
supported the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) guerillas 
who were fighting for the independence of Namibia from South Africa. The 
white society in South Africa saw itself imperilled and sought to strengthen . i 
the horne front and reduce its external military commitments. 
In Rhodesia the civil war against the nationalist guerilla groups was 
intensifying. In August 1967 South Africa had sent troops into Rhodesia 
to help the Rhodesian forces combat the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary 
Army (ZPRA--the military wing of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, 
ZAPU) whose guerilla forces were based in Zambia.n This action further 
increased Rhodesia's dependence on South Africa. The defense against 
ZPRA guerillas had been fairly successful. However, another guerilla force, 
the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), under the command 
of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), had gained the support of 
the PRE LIMO government in Mozambique, and was straining the resources 
of the Rhodesian army, causing the South African government to reassess 
its military commitment to Rhodesia. 
"Patrick O'Meara, "Zimbabwe: The Politics ci Interdependence," in Gwendolen M. carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds., Southern Africa: The 
Continuing Crisis, 2nd Ed. (Blcollington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 35. 
nLarry 11. Bowman, "South Africa's Southem strategy," International Affairs (London) 47, 1 (January 1971) p. 24. 
54 
ZANU and ZAPU were also gaining increasing political legitimacy, and 
were demonstrating that there would be no settlement in Rhodesia without 
their agreement. The leaders of the two groups, Robert Mugabe and 
Joshua Nkomo of ZANU and ZAPU respectively, were both self-proclaimed 
Marxists and had joined together to form the Patriotic Front (PF) which 
was supported by the Front Line states in the negotiations to end UDI. 
The South African government, which preferred a less radical leadership 
in its northern neighbour, was uneasy about the popularity of the PF 
leaders and regarded them as "criminal Communist terrorists."u To avert 
the possibility that the PF leaders would govern the post-UDI Rhodesia, 
the S~uth African government pressed for a faster resolution of the 
impasse between Smith and the British government. 
The Rhodesian regime had become totally dependent on South African 
economic and military support for its survival. South Africa had achieved 
both its objectives of limiting the effects of sanctions and weakening the 
guerilla resistance. However, the costs of attaining these goals was now 
outweighing the benefits. Rhodesia was becoming an obstacle to detente 
initiatives, particularly toward Mozambique. The FRELIMO government of 
Mozambique abhorred South Africa's duplicity in attempting to normalize 
relations while supporting the racist Rhodesian regime. With FRELIMO's 
open support of ZAN LA, the eastern front would open up along the long 
border between Rhodesia and Mozambique, and continued defense of 
Rhodesia would require increased military commitments. This would in turn 
URichard Leonard, South Africa at liar: llhite Power and the Crisis in Southern Africa (Westport, C'l': Lawrence Hill and Company, 1983) p. 
54. 
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result in greater international criticism and condemnation. A peaceful 
solution directed by South Africa, on the other hand, would increase 
regional stability and perhaps benefit South Africa's relations with its 
neighbours and the rest of Africa. "Thus, the role of white Rhodesia was 
being rapidly transformed from that of vital defence outpost to that of a 
sacrificial lamb for a new regional order. flU 
From 1974 onwards therefore, South Africa pushed for a peaceful .; 
political solution with the goal of ensuring the establishment of a moderate 
black government in Rhodesia. In 1978 Smith reached an internal 
settlement with Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the leader of the moderate African 
National Congress (ANC) party, who subsequently became the first Prime 
Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The agreement, however, left too much 
power in white hands and was not recognized by the international 
community or the Patriotic Front. Therefore, in September 1979 the 
Lancaster House Conference began .. u It was here that Zimbabwe's fight 
for independence ended. 
The final meetings between Smith, the British government and the 
nationalist representatives were marked by tension, but also compromise. 
A new constitution which would place total power in the hands of the black 
majority was debated. The Zimbabwean House of Assembly would consist 
UM. 'famarkin, !he Making of Zimbabwe: DecolonizatiDD in Reqipnal and International Politics (London: Frank em & Co. Ltd., 1990) pp. 22-23. 
uThe Lancaster House Conference, which was held in London, was the finalllll!l!tinq between the British qoyernment, smith and the Zimbabwean 
independence leaders. It was the only IIII!I!tinq which Muqabe had been allowed to attend. He agreed to the conditions of the aqreement negotiated 
at that conference only after President lIachei of Mozambique placed considerable pressure on him. For a 1m df.tailed examination of the Lancaster 
House ta1ks and the people involved, see D. Martin and P. Joimsm, The struggle for Zimbabwe: !he ChimDlqa War (London: Faber and Faber, 
1981); Michael Charlton, The Last Colony in Africa: Diplomacy and the Independence of Rhodesia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); and, 'famarkin, The Making 
of Zimbabwe. 
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of 80 members elected from a common African roll, and 20 seats reserved 
for whites making a total of 100 seats. Elections were to take place the 
following spring in February 1980. Under pressure from Zambia and the 
FLS, ZANU leader Mugabe finally agreed to sign the peace accord which 
brought an end to the guerilla fighting. Smith also finally succumbed to 
South African pressure and signed the accord. 
South Africa's role did not end with the agreement. There was still 
an election to be won and South Africa supported Bishop Muzorewa. 
Millions of Rand were put into his campaign by the South African 
government." Even if Mugabe won, the South African government did not 
believe it would be with a majority which ·would open the door for a 
coalition government led by Nkomo and Muzorewa, and supported by South 
Africa. When the results of the election were announced on 4 March 1980, 
it was clear that South Africa had underestimated the popularity of 
Mugabe, who won with an overwhelming majority of 57 of 80 black seats 
equalling 63 per cent of the popular vote." Nkomo, who campaigned 
separately under the PF banner, won only 20 seats and 24 per cent of the 
vote, while Bishop Muzorewa was soundly defeated gaining only 3 seats and 
8 per cent of the voteY South Africa's northern neighbour now joined 
the ranks of 'radical' black governed states which Pretoria had hoped to 
avoid. 
UDouglas Anglin, "Zimbabwe! RetrospItt and ~H International Journal, val. 35, no. 4 (Autumn 19a1), p. 680. 
"O'Meara, ",he PaIitics of Interdependence,· p. 47. 
"Ibid.. 
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Almost immediately relations between the two states deteriorated. 
Mugabe was an outspoken opponent of apartheid, and sought to reduce the 
dependence of his country on South Africa which had been so carefully 
cultivated during the UDI years. Another defeat had been delivered to 
South Africa's regional policy which forced the government to once again 
redefine its regional objectives. Instead of an easily manipulated 
neighbour, South Africa was facing a neighbour who would not quietly 
acquiesce to South African pressure despite overwhelming economic 
dependence. Although South Africa attempted to manipulate the ties it had 
with Zimbabwe, Mugabe consistently refused to succumb to South African 
pressure. In addition, Mugabe was able to manipulate those ties against 
South Africa. The dynamics of this interaction is the subject of the 
following chapter. 
CORCLUSIOR 
The above analysis of the historical development of relations between 
South Africa and Rhodesia has demonstrated that dependency was the 
overriding characteristic during that period. Beginning with the founding 
of Rhodesia, South Africa played an important role in influencing the 
internal development of that country. South Africa had always been an 
important trading partner for Rhodesia, as well as a primary source of 
investment. When Ian Smith declared unilateral independence from Great 
Britain, he did so with the confidence that South Africa would support his 
action because of both the economic and political investments South Africa 
had made in his country. 
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The dependency analysis of the UDI years explains why Smith on the 
one hand, was able to maintain power for almost fifteen years, and on the 
other hand, finally agreed to allow black majority rule. In both cases, 
South Africa's domination of Rhodesia's economy was the key factor. By 
supporting the Rhodesian economy, and supplying military assistance, South 
Africa sustained Smith's government. However, when the costs of 
supporting Smith started too outweigh the benefits, the South African 
government reoriented its policy towards Rhodesia and forced Smith to 
hand over power. 
However, the outcome of the election in 1980 also indicates that 
economic power is not always sufficient to achieve desired political ends. 
As investigation in the following chapter of the relations between Zimbabwe 
and South Africa reveals, political autonomy can remain despite economic 
dependence, allowing the weaker state to pursue an independent political 
agenda which can affect the political and economic decisions made by the 
dominant partner. Thus, the independence of Zimbabwe brought a new 
level of interaction to the relationship between it and South Africa. This 
new interaction necessitates a new interpretation of the relationship 
between the two states which is based on interdependency rather than 
dependency. The consideration of the relationship between South Africa 
and Zimbabwe within the interdependency framework is the theme of 
chapter 4. 
CHAPTER 4 
Economic and Political Relations Between 
South Africa and Zimbabwe since April 1980 
Although since 1980 the relationship between South Africa and 
Zimbabwe has continued to exhibit many of the characteristics of depend-
ency which were evident in the pre-independence era, in the post-
indepehdence period relations have developed in a way which also 
demonstrates aspects of interdependency. The main strength of 
interdependency analysis of the post-1980 era lies in the application of the 
concepts of vulnerability and sensitivity to the study of interactions 
between the two states. 
Briefly stated, vulnerability and sensitivity refers to the reaction of 
one actor to the decisions made by another actor in a regime in which the 
two states interact. An actor is said to be sensitive when it can react 
quickly and relatively easily in instituting alternative strategies to the 
policy changes of another state within a given area of interaction. It is 
vulnerable when it is unable to react or to do so only at a high cost. 
W hen these concepts are applied to the relationship bet ween South Africa 
and Zimbabwe, it becomes evident that both states are interdependent, as 
they display mutual though asymmetrical dependence on each other. Both 
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are either sensitive or vulnerable to the policy changes of the other in 
different areas of interaction (or regimes). Their degrees of sensitivity or 
vulnerability can also vary over time. It must be stated though, that while 
South Africa and Zimbabwe do exhibit mutual dependence, South Africa is 
more likely to show sensitivity to policy changes in Zimbabwe, while 
Zimbabwe is more apt to show vulnerability to South African policy 
changes. 
The independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 heralded a new era of 
relations with South Africa. The regional setting had been transformed 
once again as a result of the victory of Robert Mugabe in 1980. The new 
Marxist government in Zimbabwe vehemently opposed the apartheid policies 
of its southern neighbour. In addition, Mugabe was determined to reduce 
his country's economic ties with South Africa, which had resulted from the 
implementation of sanctions against it during Ian Smith's Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence. In order to fight apartheid and to reduce his 
country's economic reliance on South Africa, Mugabe pursued a variety of 
strategies. The effect of these policies on South Africa demonstrates that 
some degree of interdependence exists between South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
In pursuit of the objectives stated above, Zimbabwe became a member 
of the Southern African Development coordination Conference (SADCC) 
which was formed in Lusaka, Zambia in April 1980 by the independent black 
majority ruled states in southern Africa.1 Mugabe further demonstrated 
1 The founding members of SADCC included Angola, &tswana, Lesctho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, '!'anzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The 
organisation's mandate was to reduce dependency ties with South Africa and ether western states, and to pro1OOte regional development through 
regional economic cooperation. The Lusaka Declaration outlined four _ which were to re pursued by the member states: "1) the reduction of 
i 
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his government's opposition to South African dominance by offi.c:iall.y joining 
the Frontline States (FLS), which now turned their attention to supporting 
,the independence struggle in South West Africa (Namibia), and the struggle 
for black rule in South Africa. 2 Finally Mugabe cut all diplomatic and 
formal political ties with the South African government, and closed the 
Zimbabwean embassy in Pretoria.' 
The formation of SADCC and the participation of Zimbabwe in it was 
a direct blow to South Africa policy-makers who had been promoting a 
similar economic cooperative effort, the Constellation of Southern African 
States (CONSAS), but with South Africa at the helm. The inclusion of 
Zimbabwe in SADCC was particularly distressing for South Africa, as the 
government there had hoped that Zimbabwe would join CONSAS thereby 
increasing the organization's legitimacy and South Africa's economic 
dominance. Zimbabwe, as the economically strongest black ruled state in 
southern Africa, increased the potential for SADCC to achieve successfully 
its goal of reducing southern Africa's dependence upon South Africa. 4 
With Zimbabwe as a member of SADCC, South Africa's dream for securing 
regional hegemony peacefully was shattered.5 The FLS support for 
nationalist movements in South West Africa and South Africa also posed a 
economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on [South Africa]; 2} the forgjng of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration; 
3} the 1OObilisation of resources to prom the implementatiDn of national, interstate and reqi.onal policies; and 4) concerted action to secure 
international caoperat:ion within the framework of our sl:rateqy for economic liberation." ""Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation," in Colin 
Legum, ed., African Contemporary Record voL xm, 1980-1981 (New York: African Publishing Company, 1981), p. C32. 
2 James Barber, "Zimbabwe: The Southern African Setting," The World Today, voI. 44, no. 10 (October 1988), p. 169. 
'In explaining his actions, on 28 June 1980, lIugabe stated that "We cannot have any pa1iI:ical and diplomatic relations with South Africa until 
it puts its own house in order and kills the repugnance and revulsion we have to apartheid." Africa Research Bulletin (Political. Cultural and So:ial 
Series) June 1980, p. 5702C. 
4 caraI B. Thompson, "Zimbabwe in Southern Africa: From Dependent Development to Dominance or Cooperation?" in The Political Economy of 
Zimbabwe, Michael G. Schatzberg, ed. (New York: Preager Publishers, 1984), p. 198. 
sRichard Leonard, South Africa at War: White Power and the crisis in Southern Africa (Westport, CT: Lawrence Bill & Company, 1983), p. 202. 
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security threat to the South African government. Thus, both SADCC and 
the FL S were seen as threatening South African economic domination and 
self-proclaimed regional leadership role. The creation of SADCC and the 
activities of FLS demonstrate that Zimbabwe was able to affect the d:irection 
of South Africa's external policies. 
In response to the perceived threats, the South African government 
launched a concerted destabilization initiative against Zimbabwe and the 
other southern African states. This policy, outlined in 1978 as the "Total 
Strategy" against the "Total Onslaught" of communism in southern Africa, 
involved economic and military tactics intended to undermine the economies 
and governments of the neighbouring states.6 In addition, South Africa 
employed 'divide and conquer' techniques which involved offering "greater 
economic 'incentives'" to collaborators such as Malawi.' It also embarked 
on economic sabotage to frustrate attempts by the SADCC states to 
diversify their markets and transportation routes, as well as to find 
alternative sources of investment and imports! 
The initial policy decisions of South Africa and Zimbabwe appear to 
support dependency analyses of the pattern of relations between them 
since 1980. Nevertheless, a greater understanding of contemporary 
relations between the two states is achieved through an analysis which is 
6The logic behind the "Tttal strateqf and a descriptiDn of the t:acI:ics used to JOOSt effectively carry it out are examined in Robert Davies and 
Dan O'Kean, "'l'otal strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy since 1978," JOD of Southern African studies, vol 
11, no. 2 (Aprill985), pp. 183-211. 
, Davies and O'Kean, "Tttal strategy in Southern Africa, N p. 199. 
'Ibid .. 
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based on the interdependency framework, and applies the concepts of 
vulnerability and sensitivity. 
Overall, South Africa appears to be the dominant actor given its 
overwhelming economic and military strength in relation to Zimbabwe. 
However, an examination of specific areas of interaction, such as invest-
ment, trade, transportation and politics, indicates that degrees of 
sensitivity and vulnerability have changed over time and are different in .1 
each regime.' That is, although South Africa may be powerful overall, in . i 
specific areas of interaction Zimbabwe is able to influence the policies of 
the South African government. In essence, South Africa is sensitive to 
certain policies pursued by Zimbabwe, and Zimbabwe is either sensitive or 
vulnerable, depending on the area of interaction. 
In the area of investment the characteristics of dependency are more 
evident than those of interdependency, demonstrating Zimbabwe's 
dependency on South Africa in this regime. In the areas of trade and 
transportation a low degree of interdependence exists, while in the political 
sphere there is significant interdependence between the two states. Each 
of these areas is examined below. 
'The economicareas of investment, trade and transportation are the areas in wbichinteraction between the two states is mostactive. Zimbabwe 
is independent in energy supply, except for petroleum which is transported through South Africa, and in banking and finance. In other economic 
areas such as communication and labour, interaction is minimal, while in tourism insufficient information is available for the analysis being undertaken 
in this paper. 
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In the area of investment, Zimbabwe is unquestionably dependent on 
South Africa, as in vestments from the latter dominate the economy of the 
former. It is this situation, in particular, which has led many observers 
and scholars to argue that the dependency framework best explains 
relations between the two states. 
Historically, the South African based British South Africa Company 
(BSAC) played a primary role in the founding of Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) 
and the structuring of its economy. South African investment continued 
to per~eate the country's economy up until independence through the 
ownership of major industries. At independence, "up to a third of total 
foreign capital stock and a quarter of total capital stock" was controlled 
by South African companies. lO The most important of these was the 
Anglo-American Company of Zimbabwe (AACZ), which was the heir of BSAC 
and the largest multinational company in Zimbabwe. AACZ had interests in 
every sector of the Zimbabwean economy including mining, manufacturing, 
agriculture and finance.ll In addition, five South African dominated 
companies were ranked in the top ten of all companies, both foreign and 
domestic, which had holdings in Zimbabwe.12 
Dependency scholars, such as Joseph Hanlon, point to the preponder-
ance of South African investment as a powerful tool which can be 
10 Jeffrey Herbst, state Pohtics in Zimbabwe (Berkeley: University of CaIifarnia Press, 1990) p. 35. 
llThomas Lines, "Investment Sanctions and Zimbabwe: Breaking the Rod," 'bird lIorld Quarterly vol. 10, no. 3 (July 1988), pp. 1187-94. 
12Roger Martin, Southern Africa: The Price of Apartheid. A PaIitical Risk Analysis, Special ReportKo. 1130 (London: The Economic Intelligence 
Unit, July 1988), p. 20. 
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manipulated by the South African government to influence policy-making 
in ZimbabweY For example, Hanlon estimates that ownership of the mining 
sector is broken down into 15 per cent domestic, 45 per cent South 
African, 30 per cent British and 10 per cent other foreign.H Mining 
contributes 7 per cent of Zimbabwe's GDP (1988), generates 34 per cent of 
the country's export revenue (1988), and employs 5.3 of the workforce 
(1984).15 with the high level of foreign ownership in this sector, 
particularly South African, Hanlon claims that the Zimbabwean government's 
hands are tied when making investment legislation or attempting to gain 
control of the mining and other industries.a In addition, foreign invest-
ment is generally viewed by dependency theorists as preventing develop-
ment in developing countries, in this case Zimbabwe, since surplus capital 
is usually withdra wn from the country. 
yet, despite the considerable investment South Africa holds in 
Zimbabwe, the conclusion that this translates into direct control of policy-
making there is tenuous.u Due to the historical legacy, Zimbabwe is 
highly dependent upon foreign investment. Since much of this investment 
comes from South Africa it would appear that Zimbabwe would be highly 
U Joseph Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, pp. 199-201. 
14Ihid., p. 305. Richard Payne places South African investments in the mining industry at ninety per cent. Payne, The lionsuperpowers and 
South Africa: Implications for u.s. Policy (Bloomington: Indiana Umvermy Press, 1990), p. 219. The difference in these two figures may be 
accounted for if Payne assumes that South African industries have taken on different corporate identities through subsidiary investment from Great 
Britain and other foieign countries, while Hanlon presents only obvious parent company investment. See also Pauline R. Baker, "Political risk 
assessment: Contrasting Perspejives of Zimbabwe," in llichael G. Schat:berg, ed., The poJilical Economy of Zimbabwe, pp. 166-67. 
lS"Zimbabwe," Africa South of the Sahara 1990 val. 19 (Landon: Europa PubIicatitms Limited, 1989) pp. 1113, lllS. 
1 'Hanlon, Beggar Your IMhbours, p. 218. Thomas Lines concurs wiI:h this assessllellt by ntting, "At present a large proportion of Zimbabwean 
industry is, in whale or in part, in South African ownership. South Africa ems substantial revenues from it and could use this ownership as an 
effective lever against any serious attempts to oppose Pretoria's interests." However, he ad1lliJ:s that through careful planning, this influence could 
be minimized and even eliminated and presents a possible way to liJIit South African power: in this area. Lines, "Investment sanctions ... ," p. 1183. 
1 J Hartin observes that "It. might be expected that this high degree of ownership would bring wiI:h it a large element of control. In practice 
in Zimbabwe it does not. H Hartin, Southern Africa: The Price of Apartheid, p. 20. 
I 
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vulnerable to South African pressure. However, as Jeffrey Herbst points 
out, the relationship between the Zimbabwean government and all foreign 
investors, including those from South Africa, is highly complex. Upon 
closer examination, it is discovered that despite heavy South African 
investments in its economy, Zimbabwe is able to pursue autonomous policy 
objectives which challenge dependency assumptions.u 
Prior to independence, ZANU under Mugabe's leadership was 
committed to decreasing the overall foreign control in the Zimbabwean 
economy.U However, on gaining power, the new government discovered 
that the previous government had put in place several safeguards to limit 
the influence of foreign companies in government policy-making. Foreign 
control, nevertheless, remained pervasive. At independence, however, 
Mugabe proceeded cautiously in moving against foreign capital.20 
In contrast to Hanlon's argument that South African investment is 
the key factor which has influenced Mugabe's decision-making in his 
foreign investment policies, Herbst gives five other reasons, besides South 
African domination and destabilization, which have affected Mugabe's 
behaviour .n First, a provision was included in the Lancaster House 
Constitution which "committed the Zimbabweans to compensating property-
owners for any assets taken over by the government."u Buying out all 
lIHerbt, state Politics in Zimbabwe, pp. 110-141. 
ltIbid., p.ll3. 
20 Ibid., p. 116. 
21Ibid., pp. 116-117. 
22 Ibid., p. 117. 
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foreign firms was estimated at costing more than U S$ 2 500 million. U 
Second, seiz:ing foreign capital would have alienated western aid donors 
who supply much needed foreign assistance for economic development in 
Zimbabwe. Third, the government wanted to prevent a mass exodus of 
white skilled labour as had happened:in Mozambique after its independence. 
Fourth, the tax revenue gained from a productive private sector was 
necessary to pay for the social programmes which the ZANU government 
implemented after 1980. F:inally, the government did not have a well-
defined programme for gaining control of those economic sectors it saw as 
priority areas and those which should be under its jurisdiction. 
Zimbabwe, unlike most other African states, has a highly developed 
economic base as a result of the import substitution policies of the Smith 
government dur:ing UDI. The Mugabe government recognized the large role 
that :investment played :in developing the Zimbabwean economy, and has 
minimized its interference in foreign investments which had been 
established prior to 1980.24 The need for mainta:in:ing :investment, however, 
conflicts with the government's anti-apartheid rhetoric and uncoupling 
policies from South Africa as much of the :in vestment comes from South 
Africa. The Zimbabwean government, therefore, has been encourag:ing 
investments from companies based in countries other than South Africa in 
order to diversify its investment base.n 
UCoIin stoneman and Robert Davies, "rhe economy: an overview," in Colin stoneman, ed., Zimbabwe's Inheritance (New York: st. Martin's Press, 
1981), p. 123, 
24Herbst, state Politics in Zimbabwe, p. 122. 
25Co1in stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989), p. 122. 
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Through public acquisition, the Zimbabwean government has gained 
control over certain important operations previously controlled by AACZ. 
For example, the government has won control of the country's newspapers, 
it owns almost completely the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO), 
and it has acquired a controlling interest of 40 percent in the Wankie 
Colliery, which is Zimbabwe's only coal mine and which produced 3.5 million 
tonnes in 1984, 95 per cent of which was for the local market. 26 
Thus, although South Africa continues to dominate foreign invest-
ment, the Zimbabwean government has followed a gradualist policy to assert 
its control over the economy, thereby lesserung the vulnerability of its 
economy to South African pressure. This has prevented the alienation of 
white business interests and thus their catastrophic withdrawal, while at 
the same time exerting government influence and control over key sectors. 
Therefore, while dependency theory has validity in explaining South 
Africa's economic position in Zimbabwe, it cannot explain satisfactorily why 
Zimbabwe is able to adopt measures to counter this dependency. The 
interdependence framework allows for this. It also helps to explain the 
constraints facing South Africa in its dealings with Zimbabwe. 
The importance of investments in Zimbabwe to Anglo-American and 
other South African companies gives the Zimbabwean government bargaining 
leverage vis-a.-vis those companies, as well as the South African govern-
ment, as they represent important domestic economic interests and powerful 
lobby groups in South Africa. Threats to impose sanctions on those 
ULines, "Investment Sanctions," pp. 1192, 1197. 
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companies (with the support of the international community) may be a tool 
which the Zimbabwean government can use in exerting pressure on the 
South African governmentY Delinking completely, ho wever, might not be 
effective as it may eliminate the defense Zimbabwe has against direct South 
African intervention and destabilization, since the South African investment 
interests would no longer be a primary concern to the South African 
government. 
From the above therefore, it is obvious that South Africa is not 
always able to dictate policy orientations in Zimbabwe. It is susceptible to 
retaliation from both the Zimbabwean government and the international 
community. In such a context, the interdependence framework best 
captures the nature of the relationship between the two states. 
ECOKOHIC Rl:La".IOKS -- TRaDE 
Both South Africa and Zimbabwe have export-oriented economies. For 
South Africa, exports accounted for an average of 26 per cent of GDP 
between 1980 and 1987; for Zimbabwe the figure is 22 per cent." Since 
exports account for a high proportion of their respective GDP, both states 
are vulnerable to international market forces which they are unable to 
control. At the specific level of interaction of trade between the two 
states, it appears that South Africa is again the stronger, but is also 
21 Lines, "Investment Sanctions," p. 1185. 
2 'IMP, International Financial statistics Yearbook 1990. For South Africa the range is from 22.2\ in 1983 to 32.2\ in 1980. For 2lmbabwe the 
range is from 18.2\ in 1983 to 26.6\ in 1987. Percentaqes are derived from current eIport and GDP values in kx:al currencies. If export values of 
both goods and services are conSdered the respective fiqures are 29.3% for South Africa and 27.4\ for Zimbabwe. 
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susceptible to actions taken by the Zimbabwe government to reduce its 
vulnerability to South African pressure. 
The major trading partners for both states are western countries. 
However, while South Africa is also an important partner of Zimbabwe, the 
Table IU: Major Trading Partners for Zimbabwe and South Africa 
Zimbabwe's Top Trading Partners 
Exports (1988, US$ millions), (% of Total) Imports (1988, US$ mill ions), (' of Total) 
I. Germany 180.1(12.6l) south Africa 255.8(24.9') 
2. United Kingdom 139.1(9.8%) United Kingdom 103.1(10.1') 
3. South Africa 135.1{9.5%) Germany 101.7{9.9') 
4. Japan 112.8{7.9l) Botswana 73.8{1.2) 
5. Un ited states 100.9{7.1') United states 37.8{3.7') 
South Africa's Top Trading Partners 
Exports (1988, US$ mill ions) Imports (1988, US$ millions) 
I. Italy 1,966{9.1')< Germany 3,332{19.2') 
2. Japan 1,777{8.2') Japan 2,O47{11.8%) 
3. Germany 1,570(7.31) Un ited Kingdom 1,911(11.0%) 
4. United states 1 ,445{6. 7') United states 1,691(9.1') 
5. United Kingdom 1,304{6.1') Taiwan 626(3.6') 
6. Africa 1,164(5.4') 10. Africa 349(2.0%) 
Source: IHF, Dlrectlon 0' Tra~e statlstlcs Year~=, 1989. 
reverse is not true. As Table III shows, for both countries, four of the 
top five export markets are Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the 
United states. Thus, both states are highly dependent upon the markets 
of the largest industrialized countries. More importantly for this study is 
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the position of south Africa as a dominant trading partner for Zimbabwe. 
The trade imbalance between these two countries is a second area cited by 
dependency theorists to demonstrate South African influence in Zimbabwe. 
They argue that the trading relationship is such that South Africa is able 
to manipulate Zimbabwean decision-making, and hinder Zimbabwean economic 
growth through destabilization and economic sabotage. However, as in 
investment, the application of interdependency theory reveals that South 
Africa is also sensitive to and affected by Zimbabwean policy-making. 
Table IV: Zimbabwe-South A fr i can Trade since 1980 
(US$ millions) 
Year 1980 198t 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Zimbabwe's Exports to south Africa 
Tota 1 Exports 1 415.0 1 320.9 1 073.3 1 023.2 1 010.8 956.1 1 1 1 425.1 
000.6 136.8 
Exports to SA 92.5' 282.7 189.9 189.5 184.6 103.4 130.3 111.5 135.7 
Exports to SA as 6.54 21.40 17.69 18.52 18.26 10.81 13. 02 9.81 9.52 percent of Total 
South Africa's Exports to Zimbabweb 
Tota 1 Exports 25 684 20 924 11 834 18 618 17 632 16 18 575 21 541 21 748 
767 
Exports to Z imba- 162.91 362.4 330.5 256.5 184.3 169.1 210.1 217.4 255.8 bwe 
Exports to Z im-
babwe as percent 0.63 1.73 1.85 1.38 1.05 1. 01 1. 13 1. 01 1. 18 
of Total 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics 1990, Direction of Trade Statistics 1983. 1991. 
a. Zimbabwe, Central Statistical Office, statement of External Trade, 1980. Data for August to December 1980 only. 
b. South Africa does not report trade data with individual African countries. Exports to Zimbabwe are presumed 
to equal imports from South Africa as reported by Zimbabwe. 
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Since 1980 Zimbabwe's trade with South Africa has remained constant. 
As Table IV shows, the export trade balance has usually been in South 
Africa's favour. The positive trade balance South Africa holds with 
Zimbabwe is important to the South African government since its interna-
tional trade balance is consistently negative. It In addition, a favourable 
balance of trade in the service sector provides South Africa with 
approximately US$ 50 million per year from freight and port charges.so 
This revenue is particularly important for the South African Transport . ! 
Services (SATS) which handles much of Zimbabwean and other southern 
African trade transportation.Sl 
Table IV also indicates that Zimbabwe's exports to South Africa have 
been decreasing as a percentage of its total exports. This decrease may 
indicate that either Zimbabwe has found alternative markets, or that 
Zimbabwean goods have become less competitive in the South African 
market. Given that up to 1985, exports to South Africa were decreasing 
faster than exports as a whole, and that after 1985 total exports from 
Zimbabwe increased while exports to South Africa continued to decline (see 
Table IV), it would appear that Zimbabwe has been able to find new 
markets for its products. In doing so, Zimbabwe has lessened its 
vulnerability to South African market fluctuations and government policies 
which discriminate against Zimbabwean goods, such as increasing customs 
duties. 
2tIMF, ~ of 'l'rade statistics Yearbook, 1900-1990. 
so Roger Hartin, Southern Africa: The Price of Apartheid, p. 20. 
S 1 See pp. 76-82 below fur a discussion of transportation ties between South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
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Despite progress in reducing its dependency on the South African 
market and vulnerability to South African import policies, Zimbabwe 
continues to be highly dependent upon South Africa for imports. As Table 
V shows, imports from South Africa comprise a substantial portion of 
Zimbabwe's total imports. Alternatively, imports from Zimbabwe are 
Table V: Zimbabwe-South African Import Trade since 1980 
(US$ millions) 
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1. 1981 1988 
Zimbabwe I s Imports 
Tota I Imports 1 259.5 1 417.5 1 428.S 1 OSO.5 96S.0 893.7 985.2 1 051.2 872.8 
Imports from 162.9~ 362.4 330.S 256.S 184.3 169.1 210.7 217 .4 255.8 South Afr ica 
Imports from SA 12.93 24.53 23.14 24.42 19.10 18.92 21.39 20.68 29.31 
as % of Total 
South Africa I s Imports' 
Total Imports 14 201 18 440 18 376 16 229 21 650 22 984 26 894 28 682 39 528 
Imports from Zim- 92.S~ 282.7 189.9 189.5 184.6 103.4 130.3 111.5 135.7 babwe 
Imports from Zim- 0.65 1.53 1.03 1.17 0.85 0.45 0.48 0.39 0.34 babwe as % of Tota I 
Sources: IHFI International Financial statistics 1991 1 Direction of Trade Yearbook 1984 1 1991. 
a. See (a) Table IV. b. See (b) Table IV. 
negligible for South Africa. The dependence upon South African imports 
is even more profound when the types of goods imported from South Africa 
are considered (see Table VI). 
Trade statistics published by Zimbabwe in the first three years of 
independence (1980-1983) indicate that Zimbabwe's imports from South 
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Table VI: Exports and Imports by Sector 
(Z$ '000, excluding gold) 
1980' 1981 1982 
Sector Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
O. Food and Live Animals 6,106 4,679 24,860 3,160 6,118 2,204 
1. Beverages and Tobacco 7,191 399 18,645 853 14,542 719 
2. Crude Materials except Fuel 10,728 4,906 29,633 9,186 26,094 7,037 
3. Mineral Fuels and Electricity 1,188 5,990 339 49,800 38 34,893 
4- Animal and Vegetable Oils 83 298 1,070 
5. Chemicals 1,018 20,800 2,375 50,879 2,398 46,699 
6. Manufactured Goods Classified by 17,985 33,648 39,217 80,343 28,309 63,S81 
Katerials 
7. Kachinery and Transport Equipment 4,418 27,468 8,069 64,615 4,261 68,483 
8&9. Kise. Manufactured Articles and COlI- 10,812 6,703 68,970 20,518 55,299 14,762 
modities not elsewhere Classified 
'lotal 59,446 104,676 192,177 279,652 137,817 239,448 
Source: ZilltabWe. central statistical Office. Statement of External Trade, 1980-1982. Table 3: Imports Classified by 
Principle COtmtries by SITC sections; Table 4: Domestic Exports Classified by Principle Cotmtries by SITe Sections. 
* Data for August to December 1980. 
Africa are dominated by manufactured goods and manufacturing inputs 
(Table VI). Although Zimbabwe's well developed manufacturing sector 
accounted for 30 per cent of its GNP in 1986 and 35.5 per cent of 
exports,12 its dependence upon South African industrial inputs makes this 
sector vulnerable to South African pressure. 
One of Zimbabwe's primary strengths is its efficient agricultural 
sector. In good years it is able to produce a substantial surplus which 
not only makes it independent of South African food supplies, but also 
S2NZimbabwe-statisI:ical Survey," Africa South of the Sahara 199O. p. lll8. 
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gives it the potential to be the breadbasket for SADCC members, most of 
which import food from South Africa.u Zimbabwe's agricultural sector has 
produced maize surpluses for export since 1985, with a temporary 
suspension in 1987 due to drought concerns.S4 With its agricultural 
strength, Zimbabwe challenges South African domination in supplying the 
SADCC food needs for maize. South Africa responded to that challenge in 
1981 when it recalled locomotives it had leased to Zimbabwe when Zimbabwe 
had produced a huge agricultural surplus. The recall complicated the! 
distribution of the surplus, but Zimbabwe was able to reduce its sensitivity 
in this area by obtaining locomotives from the United states and Canada, 
and later by purchasing locomotives from South Africa. South Africa itself 
has occasionally needed to import additional food supplies from Zimbabwe, 
and in 1986 negotiated an agreement with Zimbabwe whereby it would 
import 300,000 tons of maize at higher that market prices." 
Zimbabwe's trade relations~p with South Africa has remained 
constant despite Mugabe's rhetoric in support of sanctions. Although in 
1981 South Africa threatened to end a trade agreement which had been 
negotiated with the Smith regime, the threat was not carried out and new 
trade agreements have been negotiated since then, which provide for tariff 
preferences for each country's exports." Zimbabwe also has, negotiated 
a trade agreement with Botswana which allows Zimbabwean exports to 
Botswana to enter the South African market without tariffs due to 
Ustephen R. Lewis, Jr., The Economics of Apartheid (Ifew York: Council on PoIeign Relations Press, 1990), p. 84. 
HLinda Van Buren, "Zimbabwe-Economy," Africa South of the Sahara 1990, p.lll2. 
15Ibid .. 
"Lewis, The Economics of Apartheid, p. 92. 
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Botswana's participation in South African Customs Union (SACU)Y Thus, 
Zimbabwe benefits from various trade ties with South Africa. 
Control of the transportation network in southern Africa was at the 
heart of power struggles in the late 1800s between Cecil Rhodes and the 
Afrikaner leaders, and remains a primary concern for both the Zimbabwe 
and South African governments today. Zimbabwe continues to face the 
same dilemma which challenged the earlier governments: that of being both 
a trading nation and a landlocked state. As a country with an export 
MAP: Transportation Links in Southern Africa 
Source: Africa Research Bulletin (Economic Series), Auqust 31, 1986, p. 8307A. 
3 'Ibid ftA I' p. ". 
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oriented economy which participates in the international trading system, 
access to markets is crucial for the continued growth and development of 
Zimbabwe. Furthermore, as in the areas of investment and trade, Zimbabwe 
faces a political dilemma in having to deal with a government whose racist 
policies it strongly abhors. South Africa's geographical position as a 
country bordered by water on three sides, and its economic strength have 
allowed it to develop the largest and most efficient ports in southern 
Africa.sa It also boasts the best railway system in the region which is 
operated by the South African Transport Services." This railway network 
dominates the regional transportation system into which all SADCC countries 
are tied, either directly or indirectly." The integration of the region's 
railways is often cited by dependency theorists as the main ingredient in 
the dependence of the region on South Africa. yet, as is demonstrated 
below, South Africa is sensitive to transportation policies made by the 
neighbouring states, in particular Zimbabwe. The sensitivity of South 
Africa indicates that interdependence, albeit asymmetrical, is evidenced. 
Until 1975 Zimbabwe's transportation system was oriented toward 
Mozambique through which passed the closest, cheapest and most 
economical routes for trade. Before the FRELIMO government closed the 
Mozambican border to Rhodesian goods, over 80 per cent of Rhodesian 
,. There are five ports in South Africa: cape '!'olD, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Saldanha Bay and Richard's Bay. They are by far the JOOSt efficient 
ports in Africa and have the largest capacities and most advanced handling facilities 011 the continent. Kent Hughes Butts and Paul R. Thomas, The 
Geopolitics of Southern Africa: South Africa as Reqipnal Superpower (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., l.986), p. 22. In 1987, the td:al. of cargo 
handled (landed, shipped and transhipped) equalled 92,805,000 mil: tons. "South Africa-statist:ical Survey," Africa South of the Sahara 1990, p. 
924. 
s, Butts and Thomas, Geopolitics, p. 3. 
40 Butts and Thomas argue that the dependence of the region 011 the South African transportation system makes it possible to consider southern 
Africa as a "functiDnaJ. region, that is, an area organised around a particular functiIII.. Ibid., p. 3. 
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trade went through the ports at Berra and Maputo. U With the closing of 
the border, Rhodesia was forced to redirect its trade and transportation 
system south across the Beit Bridge through South Africa to the port at 
Durban.u Thus, while in 1975, 63 per cent of Rhodesia's rail traffic went 
to Berra and Maputo, with the building of the Beit Bridge line to Durban 
all of Rhodesia's rail traffic was directed through South Africa by 1979.41 
Even after independence in 1980, only one percent of Zimbabwe's rail 
traffic went though Berra, with the rest distributed evenly between the two 1 
South African ports of Durban and East London.u Early attempts by the 
Mugabe government at redirecting traffic through Mozambique resulted in 
28 per cent of all rail traffic being sent through Mozambique by 1981 and 
over half by 1982.45 Thus, in only two years, Zimbabwe was able to 
reduce its dependence upon the SATS rail network and return to using 
traditional transportation routes. It can be stated, therefore, that because, 
Zimbabwe was able to adjust its policies within a relatively short period of 
time and with minimal long-term costs incurred, that Zimbabwe was 
sensitive to South Africa in the area of transportation. Zimbabwe's ability 
to respond also challenges the dependency theorists who see little 
manoeuvring opportunities for the weaker state. 
These initial attempts by Zimbabwe to redirect its rail traffic were 
seen by South Africa as threatening its economic domination and security. 
As noted above, South Africa gains substantial revenue from its service 
U James Barber, "Zimbabwe: The Southern African Setting," The "arId Today, vol. 44, no. 10 (0cI:Dber 1988) p. 169. 
Hleuan LI. Griffiths, "The chequerboard of southern Africa," Geographical Magazine, vol. 51 (October 1978), p. 27. 
uBaruon, Beggar Your Neighbours, p. 187. 
HIbid .. 
n Ibid., p. 193. 
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sector, primarily from SATS.H Any effort to separate from the SATS 
network by SADCC states signifies a loss of revenue collected and reveals 
South Africa's sensitivity to policy changes in neighbouring states. 
However I South Africa was able to respond quickly and harshly to the 
moves by Zimbabwe. In early 1981 South Africa recalled 150 railway 
technicians, withdrew 25 locomotives it had loaned to Rhodesia and made 
the transit of Zimbabwean trade through South Africa extremely difficultY 
In addition, the South Africa Defence Forces (SADF) sponsored guerillas in 
Mozambique to sabotage the rail lines to both Beira and Maputo, thereby 
effectively isolating Zimbabwe from its markets and suppliers, and forcing 
Zimbabwe to use the longer and more expensive routes through South 
Africa.u Zimbabwe was extremely vulnerable to these actions, particularly 
the delay of goods at the South African border, and lost export earnings 
amounted to an estimated U S$4.2 million a week until normal trade relations 
were resumed at the end of 1981 under pressure from the United States.H 
Furthermore, the additional freight costs to Zimbabwe for transporting 
through South Africa were considerable.5o Zimbabwe's initial sensitivity 
to South African policies in the area of transportation shortly changed to 
vulnerability once South Africa undertook harsher measures. The costs 
then incurred by Zimbabwe in adopting alternative transportation routes 
were extremely high. 
H See p. 72 above. 
41 Africa Research Bulletin (Political Social and cultural Series), April 1981, p.6024C; Johnson and Martin, "Zimbabwe," p. 88; Barber and Barratt, 
South Africa's Foreign Policy, p. 268. 
HHanlon, Beggar Your lieighbours, pp. 186-190. 
HBarber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p. 268; Hanlon, Apartheid's Second Fron; p. 96. 
so Johnson and Martin, Apartheid Terrorism, p. 54. Johnson and Martin estimate that the additional costs for transportinq qoods throuqh South 
Africa since 1980 equals US$824.2 million usinq the 1988 exchanqe rate of l.82Z$/OS$. 
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South Africa continues to place pressure on Zimbabwe through the 
transportation system in a number of ways. The South African government 
persisted in its direct and indirect support of the sabotage efforts of the 
Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) guerillas.51 In addition, customs 
delays at the South African border are common and are particularly 
disruptive when applied to fuel shipments.52 Despite these delays, SATS 
is more attractive to Zimbabwean exporters as it offers its services at rates 
lower than those which can be offered by Mozambique. Moreover, the 
reliability and efficiency of the SATS system as compared to Mozambique 
railways and ports attracts Zimbabwean business. 
Although South Africa is able to place pressure on Zimbabwe through 
the transportation network, the extent of this pressure is limited for a 
number of reasons. First, in addition to that which comes from Zimbabwe, 
South Africa depends on rail traffic from a number of southern African 
states, including Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zambia and 
Zaire. The trade of two of those states, Zambia and Zaire, must pass 
through Zimbabwe in order to reach South Africa. As Table VII shows, the 
quantity of this trade is considerable. The need to maintain this traffic 
is of interest to both the South African government and South African 
business. Second, SATS is a primary revenue earner for the government, 
and necessary for South African businesses which have links with and 
investments in southern African countries. Although these businesses do 
not like competition from alternate suppliers which might use non-SATS 
51 Johnson and Hartin note that since 1986 there have been 195 successful sabotage attacks along the Beira line, however damage has been 
limited. Johnson and Hartin, Apartheid Terrorism, p. 56. 
5ZHanlon, Apartheid's Second Front, p. 97. 
:1 
81 
Table VII: Rail Traffic between South- Africa and Zaire, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, 1981-1985 (Tonnage) 
state 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 
Zaire From 528 954 293 948 288 031 218 936 
To 91 384 99 104 113 352 115 504 
Zambia From 164 911 156 485 224 498 122 366 
To 303 393 238 132 272 175 390 203 
Zintabwe From 936 328 951 319 987 925 191 281 
To 1 394 659 912 826 747 635 1 175 098 
Total From 1 630 193 1 401 752 1 500 460 1 198 583 
To 1 195 436 1 250 062 1 133 162 1 680 805 
Source: A'rica Research Bulletin {Economic seriest 31 August 1986, p. 830SAB. 
lines, they are also not favourably disposed toward delays along SATS 
which lower their earnings. 
Zimbabwe has been able to counter South African pressure by 
supplying troops to defend the Beira rail line, although this does place a 
heavy burden on the country's defence budget.53 The National Railways 
of Zimbabwe (NRZ) have purchased more locomotives to reduce its 
susceptibility to arbitrary recalls of locomotives leased from SATS.54 In 
addition, the Mugabe government has been encouraging the use of 
Mozambican transport lines on political grounds by stating that Zimbabwean 
business should not patronize a system run by a government antithetical 
to African interests. However, until the security situation in Mozambique 
improves, business will continue to utilize South African routes, thereby 
53 Johnson and Martin, "Zimbabwe," p. 92. 
u In February 1981, Alsthom-Atlantique of France had signed a contract with the HRZ for 30 Jocomves. Africa Research Bulletin (Economic 
Series), February 15-March 141981, p. 5851C. 
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continuing Zimbabwe's vulnerability to South African pressure. Alternately, 
South Africa will also continue to be sensitive to Zimbabwean attempts at 
reducing its vulnerability. Moreover, the costs of destabilizing the 
region's transportation system are becoming increasingly unpalatable, 
politically and economically to South Africa. In the area of transportation, 
therefore, the interdependence framework, with its concepts of sensitivity 
and vulnerability best explains the impact which South Africa and Zimbabwe 
have on each other. 
The political relationship between Zimbabwe and South Africa is often 
overlooked or underemphasized in analyses of linkages between the two 
countries. Instead, economic ties, which are the most obvious, receive 
overwhelming attention, particularly by dependency analysts. A closer 
examination of the political ties between the two states, once again reveals 
that the interdependence framework best describes the political interaction 
of these two states. While Zimbabwe's decision-making is heavily influenced 
by South African policies, Zimbabwe's policies also affect policy-making in 
South Africa, although to a lesser extent. Thus, similar to the other areas 
already discussed--investment, trade, transportation--an asymmetrical but 
interdependent political relationship between Zimbabwe and South Africa is 
evident. 
As a result of its vulnerability to South Africa in the areas of trade, 
investment and transportation, Zimbabwe must be cognizant of the means 
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by which South Africa can manipulate it, and this must be reflected in its 
policy making. This was most clearly shown when Mugabe declared that 
his government would implement sanctions against South Africa on 1 
January 1986, but was unable to carry out his plan.55 Not only had he 
overestimated the international support such a move would garner, he had 
underestimated the capacity of Zimbabwe's economy to survive a complete 
disassociation from South Africa. Furthermore, he lacked support from his 
cabinet and Zimbabwean business interests. Finally, Zimbabwe would have 
faced severe repercussions from South Africa which, most likely, would 
have retaliated with increased destabilization." Thus, economic vulner-
ability causes the Mugabe government to move cautiously when making 
economic policies which would effectively decrease this dependence. 
Although South Africa is able to influence Zimbabwean economic 
policy-making because of Zimbabwe's reliance in the aforementioned 
economic areas, South Africa is nevertheless affected· by aspects of the 
Mugabe government's policies. Initially, the victory of Mugabe and ZANU 
in the independence elections had a profound effect on South Africa's 
regional policy making. This was recognized by an opposition member of 
the South African House of Assembly, who stated that the independence of 
Zimbabwe under Mugabe, 
will have a profound effect also on the whole of Southern Africa. It will 
certainly change the strategic map of our subcontinent. With the bush war 
over, with sanctions lifted and with transport links reopened, it could have 
a significant effect on the economy of this region. More than this: The 
5hZimbabwe," Africa Contemporary Record 1986-87, ed. Colin Lequm (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1988), p. B910. 
uMargaret Lee, "Political and Economic Implications of Sanctions aqaint South Africa: The case of Zimbabwe," Journal of african studies, vaL 
15, nos. H (Fall/Hinter 1988) p. 56. 
independence of Zimbabwe under Prime Minister Robert Mugabe will have a pro-
found impact also on south Africa. S1 
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This observer recognized that Mugabe's electoral triumph required a re-
evaluation of South Africa's regional and domestic policies particularly with 
respect to South Africa's two main concerns, internal political stability and 
economic security. 
The new Zimbabwe government under Mugabe increased South 
Africa's concern for political stability in a number of ways. First, the 
potential and promise of Zimbabwe to be a successful black ruled state 
gave "the disadvantaged races of South Africa new hope, and enhanced 
confidence in the justice of their demands and in the inevitability that 
they will ultimately have to be conceded."sa This new hope was reflected 
in increasing unrest within the South African townships which eventually 
received international attention in 1983 and 1984. Furthermore, the victory 
of Mugabe sent the message to South Africa that "those who stand for 
genuinely popular political aspirations, who are willing to sacrifice and if 
necessary fight for freedom, can expect strong popular support."" All 
others who attempt to operate within the established system would face the 
same fate as Bishop Muzorewa, leader of the moderate South African 
supported African National Congress party, in his humiliating defeat.60 
This possibility is of great concern to the white regime in South Africa 
51 statement by C.N. Elgin. South Africa, House of Assembly, Debates, vol. 86 (17 April 1980), col. 4169. 
ShSouth Africa watches Mr. Mugahe,· The Times, April, 1980, col. l3b. See also Xu Dewen, "Zimbabwe Counters South Africa," Bei:iing Review, 
vol. 25, no. 5 (February 1, 1982) p. 8., and Martin, Southern Afr:ica: The Price of Apartheid, p. 43. 
stLeonard, South Africa at Nar, p. 54. 
6oIbid .. 
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which sees the maintenance of its power and position as its single most 
important objective. 
Second, Mugabe's policy of reconciliation was also threatening to the 
white regime in South Africa. When Mugabe took office, he indicated that 
he would seek to reconcile the differences between the country's white 
minority and black majority. The success of this policy would undermine 
the South African government's excuse that majority black rule in South 
Africa would threaten the security and position of minorities in the country 
in general, and the whites in particular. Furthermore, "if Zimbabwe 
succeeds in building a democratic, harmonious, nonracial state with a better 
quality of life for all, the whole rational of apartheid crumbles.nn This 
would allow liberal and reformist whites to gain political sympathy, thereby 
threatening the power of the National Party in South Africa. 
Finally, internal political security is the primary concern of the 
South African government. It is committed to preventing liberation groups 
such as the African National Congress (ANC) from establishing bases close 
to the South African border.u Zimbabwe is of particular importance in 
the maintenance of South African security because Zimbabwe's border is 
only 450 kilometres from Pretoria. Although Mugabe has stated that he 
would not allow guerilla bases to be established within Zimbabwe, his vocal 
political support of the ANC is of great concern to the South African 
UThompson, "Zimbabwe in Southern Africa," pp. 211-212. See also Sheikh R. Ali, Southern Africa: An American Enigma (New York: Preaqer 
Publishers, 1987), p. 24. 
'
2 Gavin cawthra, Brutal Force: The Apartheid liar Machine (London: International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, Canon Callins 
House, 1986) pp. 140-1; Roger JIartin, Southern Africa. p. 6. 
86 
government." Mugabe has also declared that ·if sufficient military and 
financial support for military action against South Africa was evidenced by 
African and western countries, and the FLS were asked to "offer our 
countries as bases, ... the Frontline states would consider the matter in a 
different light ... ".H The implications of such a statement by Mugabe are 
carefully considered by the South African government, which witnessed the 
support that ZAPU and ZANU had received during their liberation struggle 
from Zambia and Mozambique, and attributed the success of the guerilla 
movements in Zimbabwe to that support. The same success would be likely 
for South African black nationalist groups if they had the military support 
of the neighbouring states, especially Zimbabwe. 
Each of these political challenges brought a response from the South 
African government. The primary response to the possibility that Zimbabwe 
would offer a model for South African liberation movements was to ensure 
that Mugabe would not be succe.ssful. To do so the South African 
government employed a variety of destabilization tactics which attempted 
to undermine the stability of Mugabe's government. Increasing the rift 
between the two main tribes in Zimbabwe, the Ndebele and the Shona, 
would demonstrate that a black government was incapable of achieving 
stability within Zimbabwe, and by implication within South Africa. By 
supporting espionage activities carried out by whites, the South African 
government could demonstrate that Mugabe's reconciliation policy was a 
"Barber, "Zimbabwe: The Southern African Setting," p. 171. 
uQuated from an interview lrith the Observer, London, 27 May 1984, in Colin Legum, The Battlefronts of Southern Africa (New York: Africana 
Publishing Company, 1988), p. 350. 
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failure thereby mitigating the second challengeY However, neither of 
these tactics have been entirely successful as Mugabe has managed to 
maintain power and a degree of stability, while whites who initially left 
Zimbab we are returning. The policies of the Zimbabwean government 
caused the South African government to react which indicates sensitivity 
to former by the latter. Furthermore, the objective of the South African 
government, to force Zimbabwe to act according to South Africa's 
preferences, was not achieved thereby demonstrating that Zimbabwe is able 
to remain independent from South African policy-making. 
South Africa has also found it djfficult to deal with the third 
challenge. In an effort to deter guerilla incursions along the Zimbabwean 
front, the south African government provided concessions to white farmers 
to remain on their farms along the border area. However, despite fines for 
deserting and rewards for remaining, most of the farming area along this 
border was abandoned by the whites. By 1987 40 per cent of all farms 
along the Zimbabwean border were unoccupied and "a guerilla unit [could] 
march from the Limpopo river through to Pietersburg (100 miles south of 
Zimbabwe) without having to set foot on a farm occupied by whites!'" 
Thus, it was fundamentally important that the South African government 
receive assurances from Mugabe that he would not allow ANC and PAC (Pan 
African Congress) bases to be established in his country. South Africa 
therefore attempted to pressure Mugabe into signing a non-aggression 
nSouth Africa's involvement in espionage activities is well documented in Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, and Johnson and Martin, Frontline 
southern Africa. 
"Christopher Coker, South Africa's Security Dilemmas (New York: The Center for strateqic and International studies, Hashinqton D.C., Praeqer, 
1987) p. 2ll. 
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agreement similar to the Nkomati Accord signed by Mozambique in 1984. 
Mugabe refused to consent to such a pact, but gave assurances that at 
present he would not allow the ANC or PAC to establish military bases. 
Nevertheless, Mugabe continues to frustrate South African desires by 
remaining a vocal political supporter of nationalist movements in South 
Africa, and allowing diplomatic representation of these groups in his 
country. 
In terms of economic security, South Africa is committed to keeping 
its neighbours reliant on it for markets, investment, and imports of 
manufactured and agricultural goods. The continued dependence of 
southern Africa on South Africa fulfils a twofold purpose. First, it is used 
as a propaganda tool by South Africa to hinder the implementation of 
comprehensive international sanctions. In publications such as South 
Africa: Mainstay of Southern Africa, the South African government details 
the economic interconnectedness of the region and indicates that any 
sanctions levelled at South Africa would hurt the southern African states 
more than the intended target." One senior South African official has 
also stated that the "relatively underdeveloped countries [in the region] 
depend ... on imports of capital and intermediate goods from South Africa" 
for their industrial output, and that finding alternative trade and 
transportation routes would be very difficult since existing ones "represent 
the most economic and efficient arrangement feasible in terms of physical 
capacity, operation and maintenance. "n By exploiting the needs of 
'
7 South Africa, South Africa: Mainstay of Southern Africa (Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1985), p. 1. 
"rhea Malan, "Sanctions and Economic Interdependence in Southern Africa,M SouthAfrican Keispoint, no. 1 (ottawa: South African ElIIbassy, 
1987), pp. H 
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southern Africa and by playing on western concerns for the development 
of this region, South Africa effectively hindered comprehensive sanctions 
from its major trading partners. This continued until international opinion 
became sufficiently outraged by South Africa's apartheid policies in the 
mid-1980s that the governments of many western countries had little choice 
but to implement sanctions. 
Secondly, the continued dependency of southern African states upon 
South Africa provides the South African government with opportunities to 
destabilize its neighbours and keep them weak and dependent. South 
Africa also hoped that economic links would lessen the anti-apartheid 
rhetoric emanating from regional states, in particular from Zimbabwe. The 
establishment of SADCC which proclaimed a mandate to reduce dependency 
on South Africa, and the inclusion of Zimbabwe which made this objective 
a possibility, threatened the continued effectiveness of the manipulation of 
economic ties by South Africa to foster its interests. 
To undermine the economic potential of Zimbabwe, south Africa 
employed several destabilization tactics including covert destabilization, 
espionage, guerilla incursions and economic sabotage." The economic 
effects of the destabilization campaigns against Zimbabwe were very costly 
to that country.IO Nevertheless, Hugabe stood firm against these 
pressures by remaining an ardent critic of apartheid. In addition, Hugabe 
"covert destabilization capitWes on the internal divisions btween trihal groups and their paIi.tical representatives which causes "the 
weakening, or the destruction, of a regime by an oade agency in such a way that it seems to have happened by a natural internal prooess." 
Victoria Brittain, Hidden Lives, Hidden Deaths: South Africa's Crippling of a Continent (London: Faber and Faber, 1988), p. 107. 
10 See sections on investment, trade and transportation above. 
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joined in the cry emanating from Africa for the implementation of 
comprehensive sanctions against South africa. In a statement to the United 
Nations General Assembly on 3 october 1986, Mugabe called on the United 
Nations to, 
condemn strongly the Pretoria regime for [terrorism and military 
destabi lizationJ and for recruiting, training, financing I directing and 
infiltrating bandits and mercenary elements into neighbouring countries to 
destabilize and overthrow their Governments. 11 
He also called for "concrete actions against [the] international monster" of 
apartheid.12 He gave his full support to the sanctions package agreed 
upon by the United nations, and the one embraced by the Commonwealth 
heads of government in 1985.13 Although Zimbabwe was unable to 
. 
implement sanctions itself, Mugabe's call for sanctions was politically 
important as it demonstrated his country's commitment to the overthrow of 
apartheid in South Africa to the international community.H South Africa's 
response to Zimbabwe's political policies of supporting guerilla groups, 
opposing apartheid, calling for sanctions, and Mugabe's ability to maintain 
a degree of political stability within Zimbabwe indicates that South Africa 
is affected by and politically sensitive to these policies. This sensitivity 
demonstrates that interdependency theory is a valuable tool for analyzing 
11 HAddress by Mr. Robert Muqaile, Prime Minister of the Republic of Zimbabwe, N united !lations, General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Provisional 
Verbatim Record of the Twenty-first lIeeting, 3 October 1986, p. 7. 
72Ibid 8 
., p .. 
! 'The sanction package agreed to by the Commonwealth heads of government in October 1985 included: 
1) a ban on all new govermrent loans to the South African government and its agencies and an agreement to take whatever 
unilateral action might be possible to prohihil: imports of Krugerrands; 2) a ban on the sale and export of oil to South Africa; 
3) a ban on new contracts for the sale and export of nuclear goods, materials, and technology; 4) a ban on the sale and 
export of computer equipment capable of use by the South African military forces, police, or security forces; 5) an embargo 
on all military cooperation; 6) a strict and rigorously controlled embargo on imports of arms, ammunition, military vehicles, 
and paramilitary equipment from South Africa; 7) the cessation of government funding for trade missions to South Africa 
or for participation in exhibitions and trade fairs; and 8) the discouragement of all cultural and scientific events except 
where they contribute toward the ending of apartheid or have no possible role in promoting it. 
J.P. Hayes, Economic Effects of Sanctions on Southern Africa (Sydney: Goller, 1987) pp. 11-12. In Lee, "Sanctions agaillst South Africa," pp. 52-53. 
14 Lee, "Sanctions against South Africa," p. 52. 
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the relationship between these two states; it shows that while South africa 
is a dominant actor in the region, it is not unaffected by the policies of 
its neighbours, especially Zimbabwe. 
CO.CLUBIO. 
The examination of the economic and political relations between 
Zimbabwe and South Africa has revealed that aspects of both dependency 
and interdependency are evident. Although Zimbabwe is economically 
dependent on South Africa and is affected by South African attempts at 
maintaining and increasing that dependency, Zimbabwe has had some 
success at reducing the impact of South African policies. In addition, the 
Zimbabwean government is able to implement policies to which South Africa 
is sensitive. The responses of the South African government, which often 
do not achieve their ultimate objectives, signify that South Africa is also 
affected by Zimbabwean policies. This mutual but asymmetrical dependence 
confirms that interdependency analysis is applicable to the study of the 
relationship between these two states, and that it compliments dependency 
analysis. 
CHAPTER 5 
Conclusions 
The examination of the relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe 
until 1989 has demonstrated that a framework of analysis which takes into 
account the theories of dependence as well as interdependence is necessary 
in order to gain a complete understanding of the interaction between the 
two states. 
Dependency analysis, applied in the orthodox sense articulated by 
Prebisch, Frank and Valenzuela, provides insight into the historical 
development of relations between South Africa and its neighbours, 
especially Zimbabwe. It indicates how and why the relationship was 
dominated by South Africa and how Zimbabwe, as the colony of Rhodesia, 
carne to be dependent upon and integrated with the South African economy. 
Dependency analysis establishes the effect which colonialism had upon the 
development of the two states in placing Zimbabwe in a subordinate 
position to South Africa. Finally, it demonstrates how South Africa was 
able to reinforce those ties during the years of Rhodesia's Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence. 
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The internationally recognized independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, 
however, challenged dependency assumptions. Free from the political 
colonial ties which limited its sovereignty prior to 1980, Zimbabwe has 
exhibited a high degree of political and economic independence. Further-
more, South Africa has been found to be somewhat dependent upon its 
neighbour. In other words, it responds to and is affected by policy 
changes made by the Zimbabwean government. To account for this, 
interdependency theory, based on the assumption of mutual dependence, 
was applied in the examination of contemporary relations between the two 
states. In doing so, it was revealed that the concepts of sensitivity and 
vulnerability I when applied to the responses of the two states to each 
other, provided insight into explaining the behaviour of the two govern-
ments. 
In examining four areas in which the two states interact, the areas 
of investment, trade and transportation and the political realm, it was 
found that each state exhibits a different level of susceptibility to the 
actions of the other state within each regime. overall, South Africa tended 
to exhibit sensitivity in that it was able to respond quickly and usually 
effectively to Zimbabwe's actions in each area considered. However, 
occasionally South Africa was unable to react effectively to policies or 
decisions made by the Zimbabwean government, particularly in the political 
arena. Alternately f Zimbabwe appeared to be more vulnerable to South 
African action, especially in the economic areas. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe 
has demonstrated a capacity to lessen its vulnerability in the economic 
areas which were examined. In the political realm, interdependence was 
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most clearly exhibited with both states bemg sensitive to each other's 
political policies. 
In illuminating the interdependence of these two states, this thesis 
does not deny the overwhelming economic dominance of South Africa in 
comparison to Zimbabwe. Neither does it ignore the military power south 
Africa exerts over Zimbabwe and the region of southern Africa. These are 
very clear and obvious characteristics of regional relations. However, the 
purpose of examining interdependency ties is to attempt to gain insight 
into the possible future for regional relations were South Africa to become 
a majority ruled state, as is likely in the near future. 
Events within South Africa are transpiring very rapidly. In the 
three years since F.W. de Klerk became President of South Africa, replacing 
P.W. Botha, a new era in South African domestic and foreign policy-making 
appears to have begun. The release of Nelson Mandela and other political 
prisoners, the remstatement of the ANC, and changes to the apartheid 
system, including desegregation of public areas and of some parts of the 
education system, foreshadow the eventual dismantling of the racist system 
and the establishment of a non -racial majority ruled state. If this were 
to occur, the regional economic and political setting would once again 
undergo substantial change. 
The potential of that change for regional relations was made clear 
when, in April 1991, a breakthrough meeting took place between Mugabe 
and Mr. Desmond Krough, the senior advisor to the governor of the South 
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African Reserve Bank.l This meeting, which was the first between Mugabe 
and a high level South African official since 1980, may be a watershed in 
relations between the two states. It demonstrated Mugabe's recognition 
that the progress made in South Africa has been sufficient to warrant the 
end of its international isolation, and that perhaps South Africa could play 
a new role within the region. 
Although it is difficult to predict what a new South African role 
might be, two aspects of its present position in the region will contribute 
to determining that role. First is South Africa's economic dorrrination, and 
second. is its interdependence with the region. South Africa's economic 
dorrrination, if it persists, might either make it into a leader of economic 
organizations such as SADCC in which it could potentially lend substantial 
development assistance to the neighbouring states. Alternatively, its 
economic dorrrination may hinder the development and economic growth of 
regional states since it would likely attract the most foreign interest and 
sympathy, along with investment and development assistance. 
The interdependence of the region will also affect the position of 
South Africa. Interdependence within southern Africa requires further 
study in order to determine the direction future economic relations could 
take. With respect to the relationship studied in this paper, it seems 
likely that majority rule in South Africa will lead to even greater 
interdependence, since the spectre of apartheid will be removed allowing 
greater cooperation in the areas of in vestment, trade and transportation. 
lAfrica Research Bulletin (Political Series), April 1991, p. lOO75C. 
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Such cooperation is likely between South Africa· and Zimbabwe if the ANC 
makes up the post-apartheid government given the persistent support 
Mugabe has given to this organization since 1980. Greater cooperation in 
trade and transportation will be beneficial to both states. As was argued 
in chapter four, South Africa is an important trading partner for Zimbabwe, 
although this has been more significant as a source of imports rather than 
a destination for exports from Zimbabwe. With greater cooperation, the 
vast South Africa market may be opened to Zimbabwean exporters which 
may have been prevented from exporting to South Africa because of the 
latter's racial policies. South Africa's advanced railway system, if 
operating efficiently, could offer Zimbabwe greater access to world markets 
and suppliers. 
Although the changing nature of relations within the region may 
challenge the arguments presented in this thesis, the two theoretical 
frameworks utilized here provide a basis for examining future relations. 
Areas of interaction which were examined in the pre-1989 context will 
continue to require attention as a new regional setting emerges. 
Previously, by ignoring these areas of interaction, potential strengths of 
the region have previously been excluded from investigation. Examination 
of the interdependence in the region indicates that many levels of 
cooperation exist which must be considered now in order that effective 
policies may be made in the future. Thus, while dependency analysis 
allows us to understand the past, interdependency analysis points to the 
future. 
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